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ABSTRACT 
 
The concerns over deteriorating global climate change have been leading to 
the creation of several global initiatives, such as the Climate Change Convention and 
Kyoto Protocol. However, the effects of those globally coordinated initiatives have 
been doubted since their advent, and research on the effectiveness of those efforts has 
been a focus of global attention. The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of 
the commons that arise from climate changes, and investigate to what extent current 
market incentives perform to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases. The paper 
empirically assesses the factors and conditions that affect the market incentives in the 
current environment, and intends to provide an insight into the future international 
scheme for coordinated efforts.  
The basic premise of the paper is that the development of technology to stop 
global warming can serve as an incentive in and of itself. We develop this technology 
driven approach in the framework of an open economy in which there exists strong 
domestic political pressure for economic growth. This paper begins by examining the 
needs to develop technology for the reduction of carbon emissions. Following this 
discussion the paper presents a theoretical model to examine if the desire for growth 
through international trade encourages investment in technology, and examines how 
this induced level of investment relates to the globally efficient level of investment. 
Finally, the paper empirically investigates some of the determinants of technology 
investment using cross country panel data over time.  
In our theoretical model we derive propositions that the level of technology 
depends on the degree of openness, the cost of developing green technology and the 
importance which a country places on material growth and a clean environment (the 
weights associated with these items in a country‟s welfare function). Through our 
  
empirical studies, we first examine the potential explanatory variables that affect both 
welfare weights and technology development cost, and then choose the level of 
income, unemployment rate, degree of openness, number of ratified major 
environmental conventions, degree of democracy and regional peer effect as a set of 
important socio-economic explanatory variables that influence the level of technology.   
Our theoretical derivations suggest that the degree of openness has a positive effect on 
stimulating investment in clean technology, while factors affecting the welfare weight 
on material progress are likely to have a negative effect. The factors affecting the 
development costs also need careful attention. We can summarize our empirical 
findings as follows. 
First, we find the degree of openness is related to the degree of the green 
technology development. We find that countries that have been under high growth 
pressure do not necessarily confirm this relationship. However, when we consider the 
different openness measurement, the Sachs and Warner openness measure, it seems 
that degree of openness is positively related to the development of green technology.. 
Second, we find that unemployment rate has negative influence on developing green 
technology and the degree of influence depends on the stage of economic development. 
Third, we find that the degree of democracy has different effect on developing green 
technology for countries with different level of income. For example, we find that the 
degree of democracy for high income countries has a negative effect on the technology 
investment. However, in highly developing countries, we find positive effects. Fourth, 
we show that there are regional peer efforts on developing the green technology in 
certain regions. For instance, we find that the European region with shared cultural 
heritage shows a positive peer effect on developing the green technology. However, 
we find the opposite effect for the North American Region. Fifth, we find that two 
  
most recent conventions such as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol have positive 
effects on developing the technology. This implies that the exogenously given welfare 
weight on environment through the major convention dummies that countries have 
signed and ratified affects the development of technology in a positive way.  
Finally, the policy implications from our examinations are not straightforward. 
In the absence of coordinated efforts, each country has different incentives for the 
investment in clean technology and the incentive compatible mechanism to allocate 
the burden of developing world optimum technology would be extremely difficult. 
Those countries with certain favorable characteristics with the high degree of openness, 
low development cost and greater revealed preference for clean environment may lead 
the investment while the rest of the world follows leaders‟ initiatives. These 
propositions however need further scrutiny and research in the future. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and the Scope of Thesis 
 
Most problems of public goods, both at a domestic and global level, are 
created when there is a failure to meet the socially optimal supply of public goods. A 
free-riding issue has been considered a major limitation of public goods and this free-
riding problem arises because there is an incentive obtained by doing so, resulting in a 
failure to meet the supply level. In this respect, a government is mostly a major 
supplier of domestic public goods. As an example, national security of one country is a 
public good in that it has characteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability. A person 
in the country cannot be excluded from the national security service provided by the 
suppliers and no one has to compete with others for the service. Therefore, in most 
countries, a government is in charge of supplying the national security service by 
collecting taxes from taxpayers and providing it according to the necessity of the 
service. Here one question arises. Who should be a supplier of the commons
1
 such as 
fresh air, which exists and moves trans-nationally?
2
 In other words, if air was polluted 
beyond the capacity to purify, who should be responsible for cleaning up the air? In 
addition, what if one or more countries make an effort to recover the polluted 
commons, but other free-riders just enjoy the result and deteriorate the air for their 
own interests with the expectation that other countries will pick up the slack? How and 
                                            
1
 The goods that have rivalry and non-excludability  
2
 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) refers to this type of public good as Global Public 
Good (GPG) and defines GPG as follows; “Goods ("things") whose characteristics of publicness (non-
rivalry in consumption and non-excludability of benefits) extend to more than one set of countries or 
more than one geographic region and don't discriminate against any population groups or generations 
(present and future) are global public goods.” 
UNDP refers ozone shield and atmosphere to as so-called “pre-existing" global public goods.  
See http://www.undp.org/globalpublicgoods/Q-A/qa.pdf 
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who will manage those problems and control incentives of free-riding?  
This paper focuses on climate change, a problem incurred due to the 
characteristics of the air as the commons. We first survey global efforts to solve this 
climate change problem in more detail and then present a theoretical model to provide 
better insights into the relationship between international trade and global warming. 
We derive some theoretical propositions on the incentives to develop clean technology 
in an open economy and explain how to test those propositions empirically. We also 
introduce a set of potentially important determinants of green technology investment 
and specify a testable model. A detailed explanation of empirical analysis is presented 
along with the direction of further research. 
 
1.2 International Efforts on Climate Change 
 
1.2.1 The Creation of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
Controversy among scholars has arisen over the problem of climate change. 
Since this climate change is closely linked to the overall viability of living things on 
earth, this issue of who and how to clean and maintain this global public good-air, has 
been the center of attention with several different proposals and responses. However, 
most scholars have agreed on the need for more effective, globally cooperative 
responses to the issue.  
In fact, it was the early 1970s when environmental issues soared as a 
significant agenda for countries, especially for developed ones. In 1972, the Rome 
Club pointed out the significance of environmental conservation by publishing the 
report, “The Limits of Growth.” This report led, in 1988, to the creation of the World 
 3 
 
Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Program. 
Meanwhile, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has begun its 
activities under concerns of scientific evidence regarding global warming (Roh 
(2005)). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was 
initiated in 1992 as one of the agreements through which countries are banding 
together to solve the global warming problem, entered into force on 21 March 1994.
3
 
The Convention on Climate Change sets an overall framework for intergovernmental 
efforts to curb the challenge posed by climate change (UNFCCC (2006a)).  
In line with the consideration of economic development level and historical 
amount of CO2 emissions, UNFCCC tried to divide countries into several groups that 
share similar interests and situations. However, dividing the world into two groups-
developed and developing countries-for setting up rules for each group is much riskier 
than one might guess. This is because almost every country has different interests 
including varying economic and political concerns such that reaching consensus 
would become a huge time-consuming or perhaps never-ending task. Despite this 
obstacle, UNFCCC classifies its signatories into three groups; Annex 1
4
 
(industrialized countries), Annex 2
5
 (developed countries which pay for costs of 
developing countries) and Non-Annex 1.   
Even though the Convention was successful in the respect that it made the 
world recognize the global climate change problem making 188 countries join as of 
                                            
3
 As of November 2006, 189 Parties had ratified the Convention. 
4
 Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, 
United States of America 
5
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States of America 
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today (Barrett (2003)), it could not suffice for the purpose of reducing actual 
greenhouse gas emission levels. Accordingly, countries under the Convention realized 
the necessity of a much stronger initiative, which led the creation of the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
 
1.2.2 Kyoto Protocol 
 
As one of the major achievements of the Convention mentioned above, which 
entered into force in 1994, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in order to legally bind
6
 
parties to limit or reduce their emissions of six greenhouse gases in 1997 (OECD 
(2005)). In February 16
th
 2005, the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement to 
reduce GHG emissions of the world, was joined by more than 141 world countries. 
This was a great milestone, because in order to be effective, the Kyoto Protocol must 
be supported by more than 55 countries and also by countries that account for more 
than 55 percent of world CO2 emissions. This target seemed impossible at first 
because the US, the largest emitter, had withdrawn from it in 2001. However, Russia‟s 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 made this target a reality. 
This Protocol has set up emission targets for each country but there are 
differences in grades even though the overall target is reducing at least 5 percent of 
CO2 emissions during 2008~2012, compared to the level of the year 1990. For 
example, during this period, the EU has to reduce 8 percent, the US 7 percent, Japan 
and Canada 6 percent respectively, and Australia has to reduce 8 percent of their CO2 
emission levels. There are additional targets in detail for other greenhouse gases and 
other mechanisms have been studied and implemented in order to secure flexibilities 
                                            
6
 Legally binding reductions in greenhouse gas emissions of an average of 6 to 8% below 1990 levels 
between the years 2008-2012, defined as the first emissions budget period 
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for countries. Also, one important fact is that developing countries are exempted from 
these responsibilities for the first period of the Kyoto Protocol in order to give them 
more time to prepare for those responsibilities and also to give them more chances to 
industrialize their economies while developed countries have to sacrifice their 
economies to some extent. However, it is a fair decision in a sense that only 25 
countries account for about 83 percent of global emissions while the remaining 140 
countries contribute only 10 percent of annual emissions and those are normally least 
developed countries (UNFCCC (2006c)). 
In addition to the emission target, the Kyoto Protocol provides three 
mechanisms to reach the target level efficiently. These three mechanisms are; 
International Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation, and the Clean Development 
Mechanism. The International Emissions Trading system allows industrialized 
countries to trade their emission amounts with developing countries in the 
international market, and Joint Implementation allows countries to jointly develop 
projects that can reduce the emission level. The Clean Development Mechanism 
serves to make developing countries develop clean technologies more efficiently by 
making industrialized countries aid developing countries financially in the production 
of such technologies (Barrett and Stavins (2003)).  
 
1.3 Implications of International Cooperation 
 
When the UNFCCC was created and the Kyoto Protocol was ratified, there 
was great hope and expectations that they would act as key drivers for reducing CO2 
emissions curbing global climate change. A few years later, many people now question 
the effectiveness of those regimes in the respect that recent emission trends do not 
 6 
 
look positive. Even though there are downward trends, they are mainly due to 
economies in transition, not because of those greater emitters who should be 
responsible for the climate change. Rather, the emissions in most responsible countries 
have been increasing contrary to the expectation. One possible explanation is that 
those responsible countries increased their emission levels on purpose, considering 
that it would be much more beneficial if they emit as much as possible before the 
actual Kyoto implementation terms come into effect in order to boost their economies 
to the utmost. It could then be considered an example of the tragedy of commons. In 
addition, committed countries might not consider those regimes as binding thinking 
that they could withdraw whenever it is necessary, as shown in the US case.  
It is still early to say that the Kyoto protocol has failed since the actual 
commitment period has not come yet. The data gathered from 1990-2006 implies that 
much stronger action is imperative since to date there has not been much improvement. 
Michael Porter argues that tougher standards trigger innovation and upgrading, 
according to his research (Porter (1991)). Also, the chief scientist at the World Bank, 
Robert Watson, said in the conference “Make markets work for climate” in Amsterdam, 
that spending needed to reduce heat-trapping emissions will cost less and offset bigger 
damage in the future. He also points out that an increase in temperatures by 2-3 
degrees Celsius could lead to a loss of global economic growth by up to 3 percent and 
the costs of inaction could run between tens to hundreds of billions of dollars a year 
(Yereth (2006)). With the recognition of this fact, tougher standards for stronger 
actions could be introduced beyond the Kyoto Protocol. 
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1.4 Proposals to Kyoto Protocol 
 
Throughout the decade, many scholars have suggested various ways to design 
international environmental conventions mechanisms more efficiently. Some scholars 
focused on developing green technology jointly. Benedick (2001) suggested that there 
should be technology development incentives to reach the Kyoto Protocol‟s target 
level. For creating the incentives he suggested there should be an international policy 
to aid the development of the clean technology such as carbon tax. Barrett (2003) 
suggested a similar idea in terms of developing green technology in a cooperative 
manner. In addition to this, he proposed to initiate R&D protocol so as to stimulate the 
development of the technology in a collaborative way. Some scholars focused on 
imposing international taxes on carbon. Cooper (2001) suggested that there should be 
a carbon tax to all participating countries within the regime. His proposal was 
somewhat different in that he did not differentiate developing and developed countries. 
He recommended that to reach a target level effectively domestic tax on the use of 
carbon should be the same throughout countries. Others were more attentive to 
increasing the participation in and deepening the commitment to environmental 
conventions. Victor (2001) suggested that we should allow countries to buy and sell 
unlimited emission allowances at an agreed price. He argued that it will render market 
oriented incentives to all participating countries and promote their commitment to the 
international regime more effectively. Lastly, some argued that we need to allocate 
more of the burden of reducing emissions to developing countries. Aldy, Orszag and 
Stiglitz (2001) and Stewart and Wiener (2001) suggested that developing countries 
should be more actively participating to reach the target level.  
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1.5 Purpose of the Thesis 
 
Despite all these theoretical and empirical discussions, there have been no 
significant attempts to evaluate market outcomes that provide insights into the 
relationship between international competitiveness and global warming. Therefore, 
this paper introduces a theoretical framework where the strategic investment policy of 
each country can be examined in a model of international trade.       
For many years, although scientists have been warning of these climate 
changes for some time, people have ignored climate change issues since they focused 
on the industrialization of their economies. Now, with the great concern on future life, 
international efforts in various sectors to curb the severe climate change have been 
made including the Kyoto Protocol. However, the difficulty associated with efficient 
provision of the global public goods has often been emphasized by many prominent 
scholars (Barrett (2003); Karp and Zhao (2008) among others)), and implementation 
mechanisms are suggested. 
We however take a different approach to global climate change problems by 
investigating to what extent the commons of a clean environment is provided by the 
investment race of each country to maximize welfare through the development of 
green technology. This welfare consists of the weighted sum of profits from private 
firms which engage in international trade, and the utility from a country‟s domestic 
environment. The model then offers a testable hypothesis on the determinants of the 
level of investment in clean technology and can be used to derive policy implications.  
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1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 presents the model that could be considered as a basic framework to 
examine the relationship between international trade and global warming. In the model 
two representative private firms compete in the global market and greenhouse gases 
are emitted from the production process. The government from each country 
intervenes to develop green technology which may reduce both production cost and 
emission of gases. The investment race between two countries is explained as a non-
cooperative equilibrium and some testable propositions are derived from the 
comparative static analysis of equilibrium. Chapter 3 presents an empirical analysis of 
the determinants of investment in clean technology. It reports the result of empirical 
estimations of the importance of explanatory variables such as the degree of openness, 
unemployment rate and income level. Concluding comments are provided in Chapter 
4.  
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Chapter 2  
MODEL 
 
2.1 Background 
 
Although there has been a consensus among scholars on the significance of 
the climate change problem and the necessity of global efforts to curb global warming, 
the controversies over the way to solve the problem have continued. Even after the 
regime for climate change was ratified, many scholars from a number of different 
fields have still been proposing alternative options and asserting the need for 
redesigning the current regime.  
Martin I.Hoffert et al. (2002) argued that the climate change problem is an 
energy problem, hence research and development on technology options to find an 
alternative way of using energy is necessary. Barrett (2006) also argued that it is 
imminent for us to invest in developing “breakthrough” technologies so as to curb 
global warming and guarantee sustainable development since the current Kyoto 
protocol approach does not provide any mechanisms that lead to the research and 
development of green technologies. He additionally argued that only the advanced 
technologies that have an increasing return to scale would perform better in the current 
anarchic international community.  
In this section, we introduce a non-cooperative theoretical framework where 
we can examine a level of investment in clean technology for each country. We derive 
a series of empirically testable theoretical propositions.  
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2.2 Model Description 
 
We examine a two-stage game theoretic model of the international 
competition among nations which consists of the competitive race of government 
investment in environment technology to clean the polluted air, and output 
competition in the final stage. 
The model is based on the assumption that emissions of greenhouse gas 
(carbon dioxide) affect the welfare of neighboring country as air moves across the 
border between trading countries. For expositional convenience, we assume that there 
are two countries (1 and 2), and two representative firm 1 and 2 for each country, 
which compete in the world market for exports while producing at their home 
countries. The production of one unit of outputs necessitates the pollution of 
environment and increases co2 emission by ik . If we denote the output of each firm 
by iy , the remaining clean air for each country i can be expressed as  
i i i i j jA B k y k y    for i, j = 1 and 2. iB  can be interpreted as utility derived from 
clean air measured in a monetary term. We also assume that the demand for the output 
in the world market is given by P a by   (where y= 1 2y y ), and two firms compete 
in the quantity of the homogeneous output. We assume that the marginal production 
cost of each firm is given as ( )i ic k  for 1,2i  . Then the profit of each firm is then 
defined as 
 
(2.1)      1 2( ) ( )i i i i ia b y y y c k y          (where 1,2i  ) 
 
National welfare of each country is a function of profits and supply of clean 
air. Let us assume that social welfare is expressed as weighted average of profits and 
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clean air, weight on profits being 
i  for each country i. i  is in general decided by 
political process within the country. The social welfare then is defined as follows in 
the open economy; 
 
(2.2)      iiiii AW )1(        ( 1,2i  ) 
 
2.3 Theoretical Analysis of Model 
 
Throughout the paper, we assume that the marginal production cost is constant 
once the co2 emission level is given. However, the private marginal cost born by each 
firm depends on ik  as the abatement cost depends on the pollution level. If the 
marginal abatement cost increases, we have ( ) 0i ic k  . However, if the green 
technologies to conserve energy and generate clean energy at an industrial level 
become cost effective to encourage their application, the cost function can have 
different property. For example, Barrett (2006) emphasized that the wide-spread use of 
breakthrough technology such as hydrogen-fuel motor would open the avenue for the 
green technology. ICT intensive technology which is devised to save energy may 
actually become a cleaner technology. In this sense, we can safely assume that 
'( ) 0i ic k   in the presence of green technologies.    
 
2.3.1 Equilibrium in the Output market when Marginal Cost of Abatement is 
rising 
 
We first examine equilibrium of our game when the marginal abatement cost 
is decreasing in ki. It used to be the case often quoted as the source of free-riding 
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incentive. The profits of each firm is   
 
(2.5)       
(2.6)      
 
It is straightforward to see that the Nash-Cournot equilibrium output can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
(2.7)       
 
(2.8)       
 
 
Proposition 1 
Assume that 1 1
1
( )
0
c k
k



 and 2 2
2
( )
0
c k
k



. It then follows that 1 2
( , )
0i
i
y k k
k



 and 
1 2( , )
0
j
i
y k k
k



 for i j and ,i j  1 and 2  
 
 Proposition 1 shows that when the marginal cost of reducing CO2 increases in 
ik , the output level of home (competitor) country increases (decreases) with ik . It 
states that in the absence of welfare weight on clean environment, there exists no 
mechanism in the market to curb global warming.  
 
 
 
 
1 1 2 1 1 1[ ( ) ( )]a b y y c k y    
2 1 2 2 2 2[ ( ) ( )]a b y y c k y    
1 1 2 2
1 1 2
2 ( ) ( )
( , )
3
a c k c k
y k k
b
 

1 1 2 2
2 1 2
( ) 2 ( )
( , )
3
a c k c k
y k k
b
 

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    2
y
 
       Best response curve  
                1 2
( )f y
 
                 Isoprofit for firm 2 
 
 
                                 Isoprofit for firm 1 
 
                                       Best response curve 
                                                 2 1
( )f y
 
                                                          1
y
   
Figure 2.1 Best response curves and output determination 
 
Figure 2.1 describes how the equilibrium output given emission cost 1 1( )c k   
and 2 2( )c k . 
When we assume 1 1'( ) 0c k    and 2 2'( ) 0c k  , and when both firms decide 
to reduce CO2 emission best response curve for each firms shifts inward leading the 
decrease in the output production since the production cost increases. We note that as 
ik  increases, the marginal cost decreases and the best response curve shift outward to 
produce a new equilibrium where the market share of firm i  is increased.  
We now extend the model by incorporating the strategic determination of 
investment in reducing CO2 emission technology by each government. Given the 
welfare weights and level of technology, we can express welfare objective of each 
country by inserting equilibrium output levels from (7) and (8).  
Let ( ( , ), ( , ), , )i i i j j i j i iW y k k y k k k   for i, j = 1, 2 denote such welfare levels. 
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Let ( ( ))i i i iD D k s for i=1, 2 be cost associated with technology level, where 
( ) ii i ik s k s   for i=1 and 2. In addition, the technology development cost denoted as 
( )i iD s  is assumed to be an increasing convex function of is  and the welfare for each 
country is assumed to be concave in is . That is, 0
i
i
D
s



 and 
2
2
0i
i
D
s



 for i=1, 2. 
  
2.3.2 Non-Cooperative Equilibrium Level of Investment   
 
Now consider a non-cooperative equilibrium level technology with the world 
optimum. Here we express world welfare as a function of 1s  and 2s . First, the 
welfare function for both countries can be written as follows:  
 
(2.9) 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2( , ) ( ( ( ), ( )), ( ( ), ( ))W s s y k s k s y k s k s    
              1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2(1 )( ( ) ( ( ), ( ))B k s y k s k s   2 2 2 1 1 2 2( ) ( ( ), ( ))k s y k s k s  
             1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2( ( , ), ( , )) (1 )( ( , ) ( , ))y s s y s s B s y s s s y s s           
    
(2.10) 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2( , ) ( ( , ), ( , )) (1 )( ( , ) ( , ))W s s y k k y k k B k y k k k y k k         
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2( ( , ), ( , )) (1 )( ( , ) ( , ))y s s y s s B s y s s s y s s             
 
We first consider non-cooperative determination of technology level of each 
country. Each country decides its best response by maximizing welfare net of costs 
associated with technology level. In fact, given 1k and 2k , country 1 and 2 
determine best response from the following equations: 
 
 
(2.11)     1 1 1
1
( ( ))d W D s
ds

   
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 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2
1 1 2 1
( ( , ), ( , )) ( , )
( , )
W y s s y s s y s s
y s s s
 
 
1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 1
( ( , ), ( , )) ( , )W y s s y s s y s s
y s
 

 
 
 
         1 1 1 2 2 1 2
1
1
( ( , ), ( , ))
'( ) 0
W y s s y s s
D s
s

  

 
 
(2.12)     2 2 2
2
( ( ))d W D s
ds


 
       
 
       2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
1 1 2 1
( ( , ) , ( , ) ) ( , )
( , )
W y s s y s s y s s
y s s s
 
 
2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
2 2
( ( , ), ( , )) ( , )W y s s y s s y s s
y s
 

 
 
        
          2 1 1 2 2 1 2
2
2
( ( , ), ( , ))
'( ) 0
W y s s y s s
D s
s

  

 
 
 By solving the best response curve for each country we can derive the 
equilibrium technology levels for each country 1 and 2. Let us denote the non-
cooperative equilibrium technology level as 1ˆs  and 2sˆ . We examine comparative 
static results of this equilibrium in the later in this chapter.  
 
2.3.3 Inefficiency of Non-Cooperative Equilibrium  
 
 Now we consider the world optimum technology level. World welfare 
function is defined as the sum of two domestic welfare functions. Let us denote it as 
*
1 2 1 2( , ; , )W s s    . Therefore,  
 
(2.13)  
*
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2( , ; , ) ( ( , ), ( , )) (1 )( ( , ) ( , ))W s s y s s y s s B s y s s s y s s          
              2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
( ( , ) , ( , ) ) ( 1 ) ( ( , ) ( , ) )y s s y s s B s y s s s y s s        
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Here again we consider technology development cost for the world. Therefore 
the welfare net of technology development cost can be written as  
 
*
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2( ( , ), ( , )) ( ) ( )W y s s y s s D s D s   
 
 If we assume that there is an international authority to govern the world, the 
world optimum technology level for both countries would be selected so as to 
maximize the world welfare. Thus, the world optimum technology level can be 
derived by simply taking the first order condition of the world welfare function with 
respect to 1s  and 2s . Let us denote the world optimum level of reduction in CO2 as 
*
1s  and 
*
2s . Recall that welfare function for each country is concave in is  ( 1,2i  ) 
and the world level of technology is decided by solving the equations below: 
 
(2.14)        
 
(2.15)        
 
A natural question to ask is whether there exists any divergence between the 
world optimum level of investment and non-cooperative equilibrium level. This 
question can be examined by simply comparing the level of the world‟s optimum 
technology with the Nash equilibrium level. Before beginning our analysis, let us 
assume that country 2 decided to take the offer from the World Authority, say World 
Bank or UN so that their technology level is fixed to *2s .  
Then we have  
 
1 2
1
1 1
' 0
W W
D
s s
 
  
 
1 2
2
2 2
' 0
W W
D
s s
 
  
 
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(2.16)                      where 2 2 1 2 1 2( , , , )W W y y s s    
 
We also know from simple chain rule that, 
 
(2.17)        
 
where 
1y and 2y  is selected through second stage Cournot competitions that 
described earlier.  
 
Therefore,  
 
(2.18)       
 
The first term expresses the effect of increased efficiency of country 1 on the 
profits of country 2. The second term denotes the resulting welfare effects of country 2 
when the country 1 reduces emission of greenhouse gas.  
 
Since   2 1
1 1
0
y
y s
  
 
  
, 11 1, 2
1
( ) 0
k
y s s
s
 
  
 
, 22
1
0
y
k
s
 
  
 
and 11
1
0
y
k
s
 
  
 
the sign  
of 2
1
W
s


 is not obvious. Therefore it is not apparent whether non-cooperative 
technology level falls short of the world level.  
However, there are certain cases where the sign of 2
1
W
s


 is unambiguous. Let 
us consider the symmetric case for both countries 1 and 2. That is, initial level of 
“dirty” air for both countries and tax cost for both firm in country 1 and 2 are exactly 
the same. We can write the condition as follows: 
. 
2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2
1 1, 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
(1 ) ( )
W y y k y y
y s s k k
s y s y s s s s
 
          
         
          
2 2 1 2 2
1 1 1 2 1
W W y W y
s y s y s
    
 
    
1 1 2
1 1
( )W D W
s s
  
 
 
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(2.19)     1 2k k  
(2.20)     1 2( ) ( )c c         
 
Recall the Cournot output equilibrium, the equation (7) and (8) 
 
         
 
. 
 
Therefore,  
 
(2.21)    2 1 2
1
( , )W s s
s


        
                
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1, 2 1 1 1, 2 1 2
1 1 1 1
2 ( ) ( ) ( )2 1
( ) (1 ) ( )
3 3 3
c k k c s c s
y k k y k k k k
k s b s b s


        
          
        
 
 
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 1, 2
1
2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( )
(1 ) ( )
3 3 3
a c s c s k k c s
y k k
b b s


      
      
   
 
 
1 1
1 1 1
1
( )2 1
(1 )
3 3 3
c sa c a c
k
b b b s
 
   
     
   
 
 
For      to be positive we need a condition                  and        .  
Since we assumed that          , and we know from our demand function that the 
intercept is a  so that it should be larger than c , the comparison between 1ˆs  and 
*
1s   
is as follows: 
 
If                and this implies that              so that *1 1sˆ s . 
1 1 2 2
2 1 2
( ) 2 ( )
( , )
3
a c k c k
y k k
b
 

1 1 2 2
1 1 2
2 ( ) ( )
( , )
3
a c k c k
y k k
b
 

1 1
1 1
( )
0
3
c s c a
s k
 
 

1 1
1
( )
0
W D
s
 


2
1
W
s


1 1 1
1
( )
0
3 3
k c sa c
b b s

 
 3
a c
b
 
 
 
1 1
1
( )
0
c s
s



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        1 1( )W D                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  1ˆs           
*
1s               1s  
Figure 2.2 Comparison between World optimal and Nash Equilibrium 
Technology Level, where '( ) 0i ic k   
 
Proposition 2 
 
Suppose '( ) 0i ic k   , '( ) 0i iD s   and ''( ) 0i iD s   for 1,2i  , then in the symmetric 
case where two countries faces the same technology and environment under the same 
welfare weights, non-cooperative equilibrium level of investment in technological 
development falls short of world optimum level. 
 
2.3.4 Green Technology Reconsidered 
 
Consider now the case that the production method, which pollutes less amount 
of environment, is more efficient in the sense that it uses less energy. We can think of 
ICT (Intensive Production Technology), which economizes on energy, material and 
time etc. Then, our assumption on '( )i ic k  changes in the opposite direction so that 
'( ) 0i ic k  . Then the proposition 1 changes accordingly so that the country which uses 
greener technology gains the competitive advantage. In other words,          for 0i
j
y
k



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i j  and        for i j .  Nevertheless, the sign of equation (18) however 
becomes indeterminate again. However, we can again consider the perfectly 
symmetric case for both countries 1 and 2. That is, if equality (19) and (20) holds, for                                                           
to be positive we need a condition                    .  
 
That is, it must hold             .  
 
For      to be negative, however, opposite inequality must hold. As 
mentioned, we know from our demand function that the intercept is a  so that it 
should be larger than c . 
Therefore the comparison between 1ˆs  and 
*
1s   depends on two different 
cases. 
 
Case1.                , which implies that              so that *
1 1sˆ s  
 
Case2.                , which implies that              so that *1 1sˆ s  
To illustrate our point graphically, we can draw a concave function for 1 1( )W D  
with respect to 1s  given 
*
2s .  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 1 1
1
( )
0
3
k c sa c
b b s

 

1 1
1 1
( )
3
c s c a
s k
 


1 1
1 1
( )
0
3
c s c a
s k
 
 

1 1
1
( )
0
W D
s
 


1 1
1 1
( )
0
3
c sc a
k s

 

1 1
1
( )
0
W D
s
 


2
1
W
s


0i
j
y
k



2
1
W
s


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   1 1( )W D                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       a           b          c              1s  
Figure 2.3 Comparison between World optimal and Nash Equilibrium 
Technology Level, where '( ) 0i ic k   
 
From Figure 2.2, we know that point “b” is non-cooperative technology level 
and point “a” and “c” are candidates for world optimum technology level for country 1 
given country 2‟s world optimum technology level *
2s .  
Thus, in the perfectly symmetric case where equation (19) and (20) hold, we 
know that the world optimum technology level is different from non-cooperative 
equilibrium technology level and the difference depends on the relative magnitude of 
13
c a
k

 and 1 1
1
( )c s
s


.  
Now let us consider the elasticity of cost with respect to CO2 emission.  
The elasticity is written as             . From the definition of the elasticity we 
know the following:  
 
(2.22)     1 1 1 1'( ) ( )c k k c k    
 
Therefore, over and under investment of the technology depends on the 
following inequalities. 
1 1
1
ln ( )
ln
d c k
d k
 
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Case 1.  
 
Case 2.  
 
In case 1, non-cooperative determination results in over investment on 
technology level than the world optimum level and, in case 2, under-investment. We 
state this result in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 
 
Suppose '( ) 0i ic k   for 1,2i  . Then in the symmetric case where two countries 
faces the same technology and environment under the same welfare weights, the world 
optimum technology level and non-cooperative equilibrium for technology level 
depends on elasticity of the cost with respect to k. Depending on the 
inequality 1( )
3 1
a
c k



 or 1( )
3 1
a
c k



,  overinvestment or underinvestment can 
prevail.  
 
Consider the case when  1 1 1 1( )c k t k   where t>0. The elasticity then equals 
to 1. If we apply proposition 2, then under-investment prevails depending on 
1 1( )
4
a
c k  .  
The intuition behind the proposition 3 is that when the avenue of green 
technology is open and available, it is likely that the government have to invest more 
aggressively to gain the international competitiveness. It is also sustainable politically 
since it upgrades the domestic environment as well. In the certain case that we 
examined in the Proposition 3, this incentive may be greater that the incentive for free 
1( )
3 1
a
c k



1( )
3 1
a
c k



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riding.  
The proposition 2 and 3 are valid only when two countries are in the 
symmetric situation. If the difference between the two countries is large enough, the 
model may need to be changed to reflect asymmetric positions as in the model of 
leader-follower in the oligopoly market. However, we do not pursue this topic in our 
thesis. 
We now attempt to derive some theoretical propositions that have policy 
implication. Although the comparative static analysis of the Nash equilibrium level of 
investment with respect to exogenous variables such as degree of openness, welfare 
weights and the cost of development is complicated, we here attempt to sketch the 
underlying reasoning and use it to derive some testable hypothesis in the next chapter. 
These propositions will be tested in the next chapter.  
   
2.3.5 The Effect of a Change in Degree of Openness 
 
Degree of openness is an important determinant of technological investment. 
Suppose '( ) 0i ic k   as in the proposition 3. We compare the marginal effect of a 
change in ik on domestic profits and utility from clean environment before and after 
the economy opens. When there is no trade between the two countries, the effect of 
greener technology for country 1 is confined to an increase in domestic monopoly 
profits and changes in harmful effect on environment, which is captured 
as           . 
 However, when the economy opens, the effect of greener technology on the 
profits of domestic firm is realized through an increase of the market share of the 
domestic firm in the international duopoly market. Since the perceived marginal 
 1 1 1
1
( )d k y k
dk
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revenue in the world duopoly market is greater than the marginal revenue of monopoly 
firm in the closed domestic market, the profit effect becomes greater than in the closed 
economy. We sketch the underlying reasoning in a simple model with two symmetric 
countries. 
We first explain that the perceived marginal revenue for the duopoly firm in 
the open economy has a lower slope than the slope of autarky. Although this does not 
hold generally, it is true in the symmetric case where the intercept of demand function 
and output levels are the same for both firms. Suppose that the firm in the closed 
economy faces the demand function i ip a by  . Then the world demand function for 
firms that operate at an open duopoly economy becomes 
2
b
p a y   for symmetric 
case where 1 2a a  and 1 2y y . The marginal revenue for domestic monopoly is 
2a by  so that the monopoly output becomes            for any cost level c.  On 
the other hand, the perceived marginal revenue for firm i  in an open economy 
becomes 
 
 
(2.23)       
 
 
where y denotes world output and each firm produces half of it. The resulting output 
for the duopoly firm is derived from the half of the world output, 
3
4
b
a y c  , 
namely 
4( )
3
a c
y
b

  .  
Therefore the output of a duopoly firm becomes 
4( )
6
a c
y
b

 , which is 
greater than the domestic monopoly output in the autarky.  
Suppose now that '( ) 0i ic k   and symmetric firms exist facing the same 
1 2 1
1 2
1
( )
32
2 2 4 4
b
d a y y y
b y b b
a by y a b y a y
dy
 
  
         
( )
2
a c
b

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market demand as we stated above. Figure 2.4 shows the benefit of trade for firms 
when their perceived marginal revenue moves outward as the economy opens. When 
the marginal cost for production at country 1 decreases from 1 1( )c k  to 1 1( ')c k  , the 
resulting increase in profit changes from [abde] to [acdf] as the economy opens. 
 
 
Price 
 
 
     a                b             c                 1 1( )c k   
 
     d                         e                  f    1 1( ')c k   
 
                         MR (autarky economy)        MR (open economy) 
                                                                Output  
Figure 2.4 Increase in profits when 1k  changes from 1k  to 1 'k  
 
Furthermore since the output of the competitive foreign firm decreases, it 
reduces the harmful external effect of the foreign firm (
 2 2
2
2
( )d y k
k
dk
).  
Since the changes in marginal harmful effects of an increase in domestic 
output(          ) remains the same as in the autarky economy, we can conclude 
that when the economy opens, the marginal effect of an investment in green 
technology on social welfare becomes greater than in the autarky economy. We 
summarize this as the following graph and proposition 
 
 1 1
1
1
( )d y k
k
dk
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Proposition 4 
 
Suppose the assumption on '( )i ic k  holds as in Proposition 3 and suppose both 
representative firms for each country is symmetric. As the economy liberalize the trade, 
the technological investment level becomes greater than in the closed autarky economy. 
 
2.3.6 The Effect of a Change in Development Cost 
 
Consider now the case when the cost of development of green technology 
decreases. The effect on the Nash equilibrium is very complicated. Suppose, however, 
that the welfare weight on environment is zero so that national policy target consists 
solely of profit. At the Cournot equilibrium in the output market, the profits of home 
firm becomes 
 
(2.24)      
 
Then the same holds for foreign firm 2. We can easily calculate the effect of 
cost changes on the Nash equilibrium level of ik . Under the same assumption as in 
the proposition 3, we have  
 
(2.25)      
 
 
 
 
 
2
1 1 2 2
1
2 ( ) ( )
9
a c k c k
b
 
 
1 1 1 2 2 1 1
1 1 1
4( 2 ( ) ( ))
9
a c k c k dc dk
s b dk ds
   


1 1 2 2 1
1
( 2 ( ) ( )) 4
3 3
a c k c k dc
b dk
 
1 1 1 2 2
1
4
( 2 ( ) ( ))
9
dc
a c k c k
b dk
  
1
1
1
4
3
dc
y
dk

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Let us write the first-order condition as 1
1 1
1
'( )D s d
s

 

. In order to figure 
out the shape of best response function for both countries we need to take a look at 
second partial derivative with respect to both 1s  and 2s . These are given by: 
 
(2.26)     
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
4 4
3 3
y d c dk y d c
s s dk ds s dk
   
  
  
 
 
(2.27)     
2
1 1 1 2 2 1
1 2 2 1
2 ( ) ( ) 4
3 3
a c k c k dc
s s s b dk
    
  
    
2 2 2
2 2 2
1 4 1 4
3 3 3 3
dc dk dc
b dk ds b dk
    
 
Second partial derivative of profits with respect to 1s  becomes negative if we 
assume that 
2
1
2
1
0
d c
dk
  since 1
1
0
y
s



 and cross partial derivative with respect to 2s  
becomes negative if we assume that 2
2
0
dc
dk
  given the assumption that 1 1'( ) 0c k  . 
Therefore we can conclude that 1s  and 2s  are strategic substitutes (
1
2
0
ds
ds
 ) and 
that as 1d  decreases, given 2s , the best response curve of country 1 moves to 
rightward direction. Since we know that 1
1
0
d
ds

  , 
2
1
2
1
0
s
 


 and 
2
1
1 2
0
s s
 

 
 we 
can plot the relationship between 1s  and 2s  as in Fig 2.4.  
  2s  
        Best response (Country 1) 
  
                                            
                                              Best response (Country 2) 
 
 
                                                                   
                                                                   1s  
Figure 2.5 Strategic Substitutes 1s  and 2s  
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In this case, the investment level at Nash equilibrium increases when the cost 
of development decreases. Although we derived the result assuming that the welfare 
weight for the environment is zero, it holds in general when the welfare for profits is 
sufficiently great. We state this as the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5 
 
Under the maintained assumption on the cost '( ) 0i ic k  as in the proposition 3, the 
investment level increase when the cost of development decreases if the welfare weight 
for profits is sufficiently close to 1. 
 
2.3.7 The Effect of a Change in Welfare Weight 
  
In addition to this, we now consider our last testable assumption. Although it 
would be interesting to see the effect of welfare weight on both growth and 
environment on Nash equilibrium it is quite difficult to derive obvious comparative 
statics results because of the complication of equilibrium levels. Here however we 
assume stricter assumption in order to draw some implication of welfare weight effect 
on Nash equilibrium level. Let us assume the following: 
 
(2.28)     1 1 2 2( ) ( ) 0c k c k   
 
Then equilibrium output and profit levels for both firms no longer depend on  ik  
values. Thus, the first order condition for welfare maximization for country 1 would 
be as follows: 
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(2.29)     
1(1 ) ' ( ) 0
i
i i
i
W
y D s
s


   

  where 1,2i   
 
When 1c  and 2c  are not affected by 1k  and 2k  the optimal 
*
is  increases 
as marginal development cost '( ) 0i iD s   decreases. Therefore given '( ) 0i iD s   
and ''( ) 0i iD s   when i  increase the optimum 
*
is  decreases.  
 
(1 )i iy  
                                           
  
 
                                        T              
 
                                  T‟                        
 
 
                                                            is       
Figure 2.6 Welfare Weight and Equilibrium Technology Level 
 
From Figure 2.6, we can see the effect of welfare weight for output expansion 
on equilibrium technology level. As the welfare weight i  increases, the equilibrium 
point moves from T to T‟. And this implies decreasing clean technology investment. 
Thus, we can summarize the effect of welfare weight into following proposition.  
 
Proposition 6 
 
Suppose that  ic  is not affected by ik  for 1,2i  . The optimal 
*
is  increases 
(decreases) as marginal development cost '( ) 0i iD s   decreases (increases) and 
'( )i iD s
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technology investment increases (decreases) where 1,2i  .  
 
2.4 Policy Implication  
 
The policy implications from our analysis are not straightforward. In the 
absence of coordinated efforts, each country has differential incentives for investment 
in clean technology. Those countries with certain favorable characteristics with high 
degree of openness, low development cost and greater revealed preference for clean 
environment may lead the investment. As we stated earlier in Chapter 1, there may 
arise a need for international assistance from developed leading countries to lagging 
developing countries in coping with technological challenges to curb global warming.  
The paper has shown also that a non-cooperative equilibrium level of 
investment is different from the world optimum level of investment and there have to 
be coordinated efforts to achieve an efficient level. It would however be extremely 
difficult to design an incentive compatible mechanism that can allocate the cost burden 
of developing a world optimum technology. The theoretical propositions suggest that 
in certain cases where the reduction of greenhouse gases also decreases production 
costs, each government have enough incentive to invest in such technology. When so 
called green technologies are available, it is likely that the government invest more 
aggressively to gain the international competitiveness. It is also sustainable politically 
since it upgrades the domestic environment as well. This effect certainly has to be 
considered in the design of incentive compatible mechanism for developing „break-
through‟ technologies (Barrett, 2006).  
It would also be interesting if we can examine the government tax policy that 
influence the private cost of greenhouse emission and international competitiveness. 
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The credible change in tax policy certainly influences the entrepreneurial activities in 
international output market and subsequently the final investment policy. However, 
unless we specify how the tax revenue is spent for social welfare, it would be 
extremely complicated to examine the tax policy in our model. 
 
2.5 Issues remained open for discussion 
 
There are a few shortcomings of our analysis which we would like to 
emphasize before we move on to the next chapter. First, in our theoretical model, we 
mainly assumed that two countries are in a strategically symmetric position. However, 
in the real world, the technological bases for developing green technologies are not 
symmetric. It will be an interesting area for future research to model the asymmetric 
case. Second, we assumed away the existence of non-tradable sector which is 
insulated from international competition. The basic intuition is that if the non-tradable 
sector is small enough, our proposition will remain intact. Incorporation of non-
tradable sector makes our model more complicated to derive theoretical propositions 
unless we impose more restrictive assumptions. We, however, leave this topic also for 
the future research area. Third, there can be privately sponsored research and 
development efforts for green technologies which we largely neglected. We implicitly 
assumed that the private R&D result is already reflected in the private production cost 
of production. However, the role of private R&D and public R&D need to be further 
clarified in the future work. 
 
 
 
 33 
 
Chapter 3 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Motivation 
 
In this chapter, we bring the model to the data, and examine if the findings 
from the theoretical model in chapter 2 are supported empirically. Our dataset contains 
over 200 countries that have different political, economic and cultural aspects. These 
would allow us to take a closer look at the characteristics and incentives of countries, 
and to learn which of these countries favor or disfavor the technology investment 
option. In order to estimate the determinants that reflect these characteristics and 
incentives, we first review the existing literature on the relationship between 
environment and socio-economic variables. 
  
3.2 Literature Review 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, we will conduct empirical analysis using 
our panel data set to find socio-economic variables that affect the technology level and 
emission of greenhouse gas.  
Over the past decades, there have been a growing number of studies, which 
attempt to figure out the socio-economic determinants of environmental pollution. 
Since the purpose of our empirical analysis is to estimate the impact of socio 
economic variables that might affect the national clean technology level, a review of 
the literature on this research topic provides some insights as to our choice of variables. 
Grossman and Krueger (1995) find that income and lagged income variables 
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play an important role in determining levels of air and water pollution. Similar to this 
study, Selden and Song (1994) try to examine whether a non-linear relationship 
between pollution level and income status exists, and they name this non -linear 
relationship an Environmental Kuznet Curve (EKC).  
However, a study by Congleton (1992) deploys political variables to explain 
his dependent pollution proxy variables, such as Methane and Chlorofluorocarbon. 
These variables he uses include both capitalist and democratic countries, the amount 
of conserved energy, population, and GNP. In this study he finds that democracy 
variables are quite effective in explaining the level of pollution. 
Torras and Boyce (1998) meanwhile select geographical regional variables 
and a proxy for urbanization and find that some positive effects from those variables 
on pollution exist. They also use the degree of political liberty, degree of inequality, 
and literacy rate for both high and low income countries to differentiate the effect of 
their independent variables on pollution. However, the results of their empirical 
analysis are not enough to prove that those political variables are responsible for 
pollution since the political variables they choose are not statistically significant. 
Neumayer (2003) uses other political variables, such as the share of left seats, 
green seats, and the share of both left and green seats in each country‟s legislature. 
However, no strong relation existed between any of these political variables and 
pollution variables. Grassebner, Lamla and Strum (2006) also examine similar 
political variables, such as political freedom, duration of executives in office, and left 
wing power. Although none of them prove to be effective independent variables, 
Grassebner, Lamla and Strum discovered that dictatorship was partially responsible for 
the amount of CO2 emission.    
In addition to these studies on political variables, many others such as Cole 
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(2004), McAusland (2003), Mani and Wheeler (1998) and Grassebner, Lamla and 
Sturm (2006) use independent variables that can serve as a proxy for the degree of 
openness to find out the relationship between pollution and trade. Some of them argue 
that trade has negative effects on environment and others argue the opposite. For 
instance, Cole (2004) finds that as countries open their economy more, it appears that 
they are more likely to adopt cleaner technology, leading such countries to use more 
efficient methods to reduce carbon emissions. However, Mani and Wheeler (1998) 
present the opposite finding about the same issue. They argue that trade outsources the 
environmentally friendly industries to low income countries making the pollution level 
of low income countries higher as they become more open. Grassebner, Lamla and 
Strum (2006) argue that the effect of international trade should be divided into three 
categories, a method which Grossman and Krueger (1995) employ in order to examine 
the relationship between growth and the environment. These categories are referred to 
as the composition effect, scale effect and technology effect. Grassebner, Lamla and 
Strum (2006) claim that because of the different kinds of economies of scale and the 
difficulty of obtaining micro industry data to judge which industry has a comparative 
advantage, it would be difficult to find the overall effect of this trade. They use two 
different proxies for trade; the inward foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage 
of GDP and the traditional degree of openness measure, that is, the ratio of import plus 
export volume divided by GDP. Although they could not find any effect of FDI, they 
prove that there exists a positive relation between their degree of openness and air 
pollution.  
In the next section we present a different set of testable hypotheses on global 
warming. Although the sample size, years of observation and the dependent variable 
are different from the above literature, we consider independent variables similar to 
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those that have already been used. We, however, also examine the relevance of socio-
economic variables in great detail.  
 
3.3 Empirical Model Description 
 
3.3.1 Testable Hypotheses 
 
As mentioned, our rationale for the empirical analysis is to test the validity of 
the theoretical proposition that we derive in Chapter 2. Recall, in chapter 2 we develop 
a non-cooperative equilibrium model to determine the optimum level of green 
technology investment and overall output production and derive some propositions on 
the inefficiency of this equilibrium investment level. Unfortunately it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to estimate the extent to which this firm level investment and 
production differs from the world optimum. However, we present a series of ensuing 
propositions, which are within the grasp of our current study, in order to identify a 
certain set of country characteristics which provide investment incentives for clean 
technology. Let us again review the arguments of these testable propositions. 
We notice that countries can exert more efforts on R&D for green technology 
because there is an incentive not to be dominated in international output competition. 
This is in contrast with the traditional free riding incentive for the use of the commons, 
namely fresh air.  In addition, we find that countries tend to invest more in green 
technology as they open their trade in order to achieve a greater level of domestic 
welfare. Furthermore, we also find that if the welfare weight for profit is sufficiently 
close to 1, investment in green technology increases as the technology development 
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cost decreases.
7
 However, if the welfare weight on profit is zero, countries have an 
incentive to free ride and rely on their neighbors to reduce carbon emissions, 
regardless of the technology development costs.  
Given these testable hypotheses, there are a number of considerations we must 
address before beginning our empirical analysis. The tests for these propositions 
require strict assumptions, just like those of which we made use in our theoretical 
model testing. Real data, however, cannot adopt these assumptions and collecting all 
the micro data on marginal costs from the entire industry is not feasible in reality. 
Therefore, we do not attempt to estimate the exact welfare weights and technology 
development costs used in our theoretical model. Rather than estimate these 
parameters directly, we attempt to use socio-economic explanatory variables that we 
think contain information on the welfare weights for profits and clean environment or 
provide us with an indication of technology development costs.  
Hence, our empirical analysis aims to examine what characteristics of a 
country are favorable to investment in technology that reduces greenhouse gas.  
Before we introduce an econometric model, we summarize the testable propositions as 
follows. 
 
Testable Hypothesis 1: Degree of openness affects investment favorably.   
 
To examine this hypothesis, we use two openness measures. The first 
openness measure is the sum of total import and export amounts divided by GDP. The 
second is the Sachs and Warner openness measure. By using these measures, we check 
whether an increase in degree of openness leads to an increase in environmental 
                                            
7
 Recall that the welfare weights on profit and clean air are numerical values that, through their 
inclusion in our optimization problem, represent the importance our society places on each item. 
 38 
 
technology investment, which is consistent with the result derived in our theoretical 
model. Recall from our model, a high degree of trade openness implies an inflow of 
foreign advanced technology that should reduce development cost, and is associated 
with increasing cultural interactions and a shared value system which may lead to a 
high desire for green technology.  
 
Testable Hypothesis 2: As the development cost of green technology decreases, 
investment in green technology increases.  
 
We examine which proxy variables affect the development cost on 
environmental technology. First, the accumulated scientific knowledge and 
engineering know-how of the country certainly affects the cost of development. We 
presume that this technological base is positively associated with the level of per 
capital income Second, as stated in the previous hypothesis, degree of openness affects 
the cost of developing green technology since the trade liberalization could make it 
easier to access the clean technology lowering the development cost of reducing 
greenhouse emission (Cole (2004)). 
We also consider degree of democracy (DEMO) as a proxy. High degree of 
democracy exerts influence on the environmental technology development cost and 
this influence can be both positive and negative in decreasing the cost. This is because 
costs incur in countries with high degree of democracy as a way of encompassing the 
opinion of minorities and this cost on green technology development differs depending 
on the preference of minorities in one country. Since we do not have prior information 
on the political preference of minorities, we gauge the relationship between DEMO 
and environmental technology development cost by using three country dummies 
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divided by different income levels.  
 
Testable Hypothesis 3: If green technology has negligible effect on the private cost of 
production, an increase in welfare weight on profit decreases the investment in green 
technology. 
 
To test the above hypothesis, we need to find some surrogate variable to proxy 
our welfare weight on profit. For this proxy we use unemployment rate, income level, 
and degree of democracy, allowing for regional variation with regional dummy 
variables.  
The well known presumption is that as income grows, society has a tendency 
to place more emphasis on environmental protection. We categorize countries in 
accordance with different income levels to see whether any difference exists in the 
level of green technology investment among different income groups. We use three 
different income groups based on data defined by the United Nations for 
approximately 200 sample countries in this test. These groups consist of high income 
countries for the top 36 countries with high income level (HIGH), BRICs countries for 
the fastest-growing four countries (BRICs) - Brazil, Russia, India and China, and non-
high income countries for the rest of sample (NONHIGH). The rationale for this 
grouping based on income levels is as follows; as a country improves its income level, 
its environmental concerns grow, followed by national pressure for policy reform that 
discourages the use of pollution causing technologies. This policy reform, then, 
influences positively the development of green technology. Meanwhile, the reason for 
including the BRICs countries as a dummy is because these BRICs countries are in a 
unique situation of fast- economic and income growth. Their income level is assumed 
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to be such that it does not meet the level in the Environmental Kuznet Curve (EKC) 
representing high income, which results in more concern for environmental welfare. 
However, they are quickly approaching this threshold. Therefore, their concerns about 
growth are most likely much higher than their concerns over the environment at 
present, but perhaps only for the immediate future. Hence, these countries may have a 
different response to environmental technology investment than either the low or high 
income groups.  
We also consider unemployment rate and degree of democracy as other 
possible representatives of our welfare weight on profit. A high unemployment rate 
causes strong political pressure on material growth and prosperity, which might create 
new jobs, such that concerns over environmental technology development or desire for 
a cleaner environment would be held back. In addition, depending on the income level, 
and hence who we assume to be in the political majority, an increase in the degree of 
democracy may also affect our welfare weight on profit by increasing the political 
power of minority groups, such as environmentalists. 
Furthermore we consider regional dummies that affect the welfare weight, 
perhaps by increasing the concern countries have over environmental protection. We 
categorize our 200 sample countries in 7 regions and see whether there are joint efforts 
to develop green technology in each region. We divide the regions as follows; North 
America (NOAME), Central and South America (CSA), Europe (EURO), Eurasia 
(EURA), Africa (AFRI), Middle East (MIDEA), and Asia and Oceania (ASIOCE). By 
having regional dummies in our panel data we expect to examine whether there are 
joint efforts to develop the green technologies through regional economic integration 
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union 
(EU). In other words, we assume that regional economic cooperation, which usually 
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includes trade benefits, can increase attention for environmental protection. As an 
example, if a group of trading partners in one region with different concerns over the 
environment is trying to start a regional economic integration unit, a country with low-
concern regarding the environment may follow the high standards of environmental 
protection set by the majority of the countries involved in order to enjoy the benefits 
of joining the group.  
Lastly, we include four international environmental conventions and protocols 
dummies
8
 as a final possible representation of our welfare weights. Obviously, a 
country‟s ratification of an international environmental convention suggests some 
heightened concern about environmental protection. However, Chau and Kanbur 
(2002) suggest that the determinants of ratification of international agreements are not 
always clear. In examining international labor agreements they find a strong peer 
effect, purporting the ratification of international agreements as strategic compliments. 
Hence, a country may ratify these international conventions do to strategic factors not 
indicative of their own environmental concern. Any interpretation of the empirical 
results of these international convention dummies, then, should consider the 
possibility of these outside influences. 
 
3.3.2 Econometric Estimation 
 
Given the choice of independent variables, our econometric panel model can 
be expressed as follows; 
 
                                            
8
 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution(LRTAP),1979, Montreal Protocol on 
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer(MONT),1989, United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change(UNFCCC), 1992 and Kyoto Protocol (KYOTO),1997   
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Degree of Technology = f (Unemployment rate, Degree of openness, Degree of 
Democracy,  BRICs, High income countries , Non high income countries, Seven 
different regions and four convention dummies)   
 
That is, 
 
(3.1) 1 2 3 1 22/ it it it it itCO GDP unemp open demo d BRICs d High           
10 14
3
4 11
i i
i i
d Non High d regions d conventions
 
      
 
3.4 Data Analysis  
 
Our independent and dependent variables for the panel consist of eight 
different variables. The data for these variables starts from 1979 when the first 
international environmental convention on air pollution was signed.  
 
3.4.1 Dependent Variable  
 
As for the dependent variable, we use metric tons of carbon dioxide emission 
from consumption and flaring of fossil fuels divided by thousand dollars of GDP.
9
 It 
measures the amount of metric tons of CO2 emission per thousand dollars of output 
produced. Therefore, if CO2/GDP decreases (increases) we consider it as a result of an 
increase (decrease) of domestic investment to develop green technology. The summary 
statistics for CO2/GDP is as follows.  
 
                                            
9
 Gross Domestic Product using 2000 U.S. Dollars 
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Table 3.1 Summary of CO2/GDP 
Source: Author‟s calculation using International Energy Annual (2006) 
 
From the summary statistics above we can see that the average CO2/GDP 
ratio for high income countries is higher than that for non-high income countries. 
Meanwhile, BRICs shows higher CO2/GDP ratio than average CO2/GDP ratio for all 
countries. However, before comparing and analyzing the CO2/GDP level for different 
groups of countries, we should note that the data in this paper comes from the period 
1979 to 2006. Therefore it is necessary for us to check whether there is tendency of 
increases or decreases of CO2/GDP ratio for the different groups of countries 
throughout this period. Below are the plots of CO2/GDP changes for 3 different 
groups of countries over the period from 1979 to 2006.  
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All countries 1367 .5486 .4631 .03 5.78 
High-
Income 
Countries 
611 .5590 .3570 .19 2.44 
Non-High 
Income 
Countries 
756 .5402 .5337 .03 5.78 
BRICs  58 1.150 .8613 .22 3.15 
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Figure 3.1 CO2/GDP change over time for high income countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 CO2/GDP change over time for non-high income countries 
 
From Figure 3.1 and 3.2, we observe that CO2/GDP slightly decreases for 
high income countries and slightly increases for non high income countries. This 
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implies that investment in green technology actually increased for high income 
countries from 1979 to 2006 and decreased for non high income countries during the 
same period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 CO2/GDP change over time for BRICs 
 
Although summary statistics show that the mean value of CO2/GDP for 
BRICs is larger than the average CO2/GDP ratio of all countries, Figure 3.3 shows 
that CO2/GDP for BRICs decrease over time. This implies that the effort to develop 
green technology actually increased for BRICs over time. This is significant since we 
consider BRICs as highly developing countries that are assumed to put more 
importance on growth rather than a clean environment.  
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3.4.2Explanatory Variables  
 
Degree of Openness 
 
As for the openness measure, we use two indices as mentioned above. First, 
we use the Sachs and Warner openness measure (SWOPEN) developed by Sachs and 
Warner (Sachs and Warner (1995)).This measure focuses on the political aspect of 
trade liberalization for 111 countries up to the year 1994. According to the authors, a 
country‟s trade regime is closed if it displays any of the following five criteria: (1) 
average tariff rates of 40 percent or higher; (2) non-tariff measures covering at least 40 
per cent of trade; (3) a period average parallel market exchange rate premium of 20 
per cent or more; (4) the existence of a state monopoly on major exports; and (5) a 
socialist economic system. When a country falls into at least one of the criteria, then it 
is indexed as “open”, and if not, it is indexed as “closed”. In addition, viewing a 
previous commitment to trade openness as a signal for the future, the data for Sachs 
and Warner openness measures were recorded as “open” through 2006 if they 
appeared as such in 1994. However, if a specific country was not open in 1994, we 
recorded as missing data after 1995 for that country. 
Second, since Sachs and Warner openness measure is a dummy variable, we 
try to deploy a more dynamic openness measure (OPEN) than the Sachs and Warner 
measure that examines trade liberalization. This openness data is collected from the 
World Development Indicator (WDI)
10
. The data is calculated by adding up the export 
and import amount and dividing it with the real GDP for each country.    
Although we use two different measures for the degree of openness, here we 
                                            
10
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20398986~men
uPK:64133163~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html 
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focus our analysis on the degree of openness that is measured by import and export 
amount as percentile of GDP (adding the raw amount of export and import then 
dividing into real GDP (2000 U.S. dollars)) mainly because our purpose here is to 
obtain a general idea of the relation between trade openness and clean technology 
level. The summary for the statistics of this openness measure is as follows 
 
Table 3.2 Summary of Degree of Openness
11
  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Open 
General 
1367 71.38 42.31 11.54 447.39 
High-
Income 
Countries 
611 74.76 46.60 16.10 447.39 
Non-High 
Income 
Countries 
756 68.65 38.31 11.54 280.36 
BRICs  58 34.39 18.60 14.39 110.57 
Source: Author‟s calculation using WDI (2009) 
 
From the summary statistics above we can see clearly that high income 
countries are much more liberalized than mid and low income countries in terms of 
trade. Also the BRICs countries that are assumed to have maintained more growth 
oriented policies than other countries do not seem to liberalize their market as high 
                                            
11
 Here we use volume of import and export divided by real GDP ( 2000 U.S. Dollars)   
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income countries did. Thus, by these summary statistics we can expect that there 
might be different kinds of trade liberalization effects on developing green technology.  
Although there is no consensus among existing literature on the relationship 
between trade and environment, we attempt to analyze the effect of our openness 
measure on green technology development by conducting simple OLS regressions.
12
 
Table B.1, B.2, B.3 and B.4 in the appendix shows OLS regression results for Sachs 
and Warner openness measures on developing green technology. First, as these tables 
show, the Sachs and Warner openness measure seems to have a negative effect on 
CO2/GDP ratio for all countries in general. It seems that our expectation for this 
openness measure is consistent with this OLS result.
13
 In addition, our first finding 
seems to hold even if we divide our sample countries into 3 different country groups: 
high income countries, non-high income countries and BRICs. As for the high income 
countries, the coefficient of Sachs and Warner openness measure variable is (-0.7010). 
However, for the non-high income countries, OLS regression results show a much 
smaller slope of (-0.2908). This implies that the Sachs and Warner openness measure 
has a relatively strong positive effect on developing green technology for high income 
countries. This supports testable hypothesis 1: Opening trade derives incentives for 
countries to develop green technology. As for the BRICs countries, a negative 
relationship between CO2/GDP and Sachs and Warner openness measure seems to be 
confirmed again. In fact, the coefficient of this openness measure for BRICs on 
CO2/GDP is (-1.047), which is the steepest slope among these three country groups.  
Second, as we can see in Tables B.4, B.5, B.6, B.7 and B.8 in the appendix, 
our other openness measure (import and export volume divided by GDP) seems to 
                                            
12
 Six different OLS regression results that consider the two different openness measures for 3 different 
country groups are reported in section B of the appendix  
13
 We expect that trade liberalization gives rise to positive incentives to develop green technology for 
several reasons as we explained in the previous section.  
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have a negative effect on developing green technology. Also this negative relation 
seems to hold for three different country groups. It seems that for this particular 
openness measure, domestic political pressure for growth outweighed the effects of 
the other factors such as cultural spillover from using green technology or reducing the 
development cost by making easier access to green technology. Here again we take the 
income difference into account to find the general relationship between the degree of 
openness and clean technology level. According to Table B.6 and Table B.7 in the 
appendix, it seems that our finding from Table B.5 does change. This implies that 
income level plays a critical role in defining this relationship between openness and 
green technology levels. For instance, the coefficient of high income countries shows 
(+0.0017) while for non high income countries the coefficient for the same openness 
measure is (+0.0018). However, unlike Sachs and Warner openness measure the sign 
for its effect on developing green technology is consistently positive. Positive 
coefficients imply that this openness measure negatively affects the development of 
green technology. Also for the BRICs, the negative relationship between this openness 
measure and investment in green technology seems to hold as well. In fact, the 
relationship is more obvious in that the coefficient of regular openness measure is 
(+0.013).  
This openness measure that depends on trade volume seems to support the 
pollution haven hypothesis unlike the Sachs and Warner openness measure. The more 
countries try to open their domestic markets, the more they try to occupy a competitive 
position in the international market causing them to avoid putting more weight on 
developing green technology to reduce carbon emission. However, for the Sachs and 
Warner openness measure, it seems that our theoretical findings from proposition 3 
hold. That is, if green technologies are assumed to be more available countries try to 
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develop green technology more rigorously. However, further details including 
robustness will be examined by considering the other variables so as to confirm the 
impact of the openness measures on the level of green technology development.  
 
Unemployment Rate 
 
Unemployment rate is another variable that may have affected the political 
decision to develop clean technologies by affecting the cost of development. Also as 
mentioned above, it indirectly reflects the lack of social stability that could provoke 
changes in the domestic policy on developing green technologies. For example, as the 
unemployment rate gets higher, domestic politicians could be affected by the voters 
who care more about least cost output expansion, which renders more jobs, rather than 
the environment. Therefore, given the fact that production cost increases as firms try 
to reduce carbon emission, it is expected that a higher unemployment rate would cause 
more pressure on growth rather than positively affecting a policy that leads to 
investing in the low carbon technology. The source of the data is again from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and the summary statistics of unemployment rate data 
for entire countries and for different country groups are as follows:  
Table 3.3 Summary of Unemployment rates 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Unemp 1367 8.90 5.04 1 39 
Hiunemp 611 8.16 4.17 2 24 
Nonhigh 756 9.49 5.57 1 39 
Bruemp 58 5.06 3.01 2 13 
* Source: Author‟s calculation using WDI (2009) 
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As we can see from the summary statistics above, there are slight differences 
between high income countries and non-high income countries in terms of the 
unemployment rate. In addition, BRICs show quite a different scale, compared to 
other countries we considered. However, do the summary statistics necessarily imply 
that BRICs are more concerned about developing the green technology than the others 
in general?  
 
Figure 3.4 Unemployment rate for all countries and CO2/GDP 
 
From figure 3.4, it appears that there is a positive relationship between 
CO2/GDP and unemployment rate. In other words, our assumption that a higher 
unemployment rate renders policy that places more weight on growth seems quite 
plausible. Also if we plot the relationship for both high and non-high income countries 
the overall negative relationship between clean technology and the unemployment rate 
does not seem to be changed. Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 show that the scatter plot is 
upward sloping implying that there could be a negative relationship between investing 
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in green technology and the unemployment rate for countries with all different kinds 
of income levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Unemployment rate for high income countries and CO2/GDP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Unemployment rate for non-high income countries and CO2/GDP  
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However, we find an interesting result for BRICs countries. Recall that BRICs 
have an unemployment rate two times lower than other country groups as seen from 
the summary statistics. From Figure 3.7, unlike high income countries we observe that 
there is a positive relationship between the technology level and unemployment rate. 
This is not consistent with our premise; higher unemployment rate provokes political 
pressure that leads politicians to put more weight on growth so as to create more jobs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Unemployment Rate for BRICs and CO2/GDP 
 
Regions 
 
Regional dummies are chosen to measure the role of a incentive to develop 
clean technology as mentioned above. In other words, regional dummies are used to 
indirectly measure the welfare weights on both growth and clean air. For instance, 
from historical backgrounds or cultural religious reasons, the degree of national 
concern may differ by country or regions. Also political or economic integration by 
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geographical regions such as EU or NAFTA could be another reason for specific 
regions to have a joint effort to develop clean technology to curb global warming. The 
degree of clean technology which is measured as CO2/GDP differs by regions as 
Figure 3.8 shows. 
 
Figure 3.8 Mean CO2/GDP comparison for Seven Regions 
 
Throughout twenty-six years, European, central and southern American and 
African countries showed relatively high CO2/GDP degree compared to other regions. 
Although this does not necessarily imply that those three regions were trying to invest 
in developing green technology, we can see that a difference between regions exists 
and it implies that there could be a joint effort on curbing CO2 emission. The 
summary statistics for different regions are as follows;  
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Table 3.4 Summary of Regional CO2/GDP difference  
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
NOAME 68 .622 0.156 0.35 0.93 
CSA 379 .471 0.444 0.08 2.35 
EURO 471 .473 0.189 0.19 1.28 
EURA 71 1.402 0.815 0.34 5.78 
MIDEA 11 0.925 0.193 0.39 1.11 
AFRI 119 0.432 0.498 0.03 1.99 
ASIOCE 248 0.584 0.504 0.04 3.15 
 
As seen in Figure 3.8, regional differences are clearly verified through 
comparing the mean CO2/GDP values. The peer effect of joint collaborative effort in 
terms of reducing CO2 emission will be verified through our panel data regression. 
However, we should note that these indexed dummies can mislead us to conclude that 
peer effects do exist if we merely consider the reduction of CO2/GDP value itself. 
Therefore it is necessary for us to consider CO2 emission by regions and their degree 
of economic development as well. For example, if a specific region has a particularly 
low amount of CO2 emissions and is relatively less developed for a sufficiently long 
period of time, the panel regression may give a spurious result falsely implying that 
the region has been continuously developing green technology.    
 
Convention Dummies 
 
Convention dummies are deployed to measure the importance attached to 
environmental concerns. Therefore, the ratification of the conventions would be an 
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indirect way to signal that one country is allocating domestic resources toward 
developing technology. However we should be careful in our use of these dummies. If 
ratifications can be regarded as strategic complements for most of the countries, the 
information gained from these dummies may not represent impacts of greater 
environmental concern (Chau and Kanbur (2001)). We further consider this issue 
when we interpret the econometric results in the next section. The following graphs 
depict how countries have performed after the most recent major environmental 
conventions, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and the Kyoto Protocol, were ratified. Figure 3.9 shows the variation of CO2/GDP 
level over time by seven regions considered. We can attempt to approximately tell 
what region or countries have taken the convention into account in their policies 
leading them to invest in the green technology.  
First of all, there are several countries showing the CO2/GDP ratio decreasing 
rapidly in the European region. This presents the fact that many European countries 
have been making significant efforts on technological advancement since the 
ratification of UNFCCC. However, this generalization is only limited to the European 
region since there are not many prominent changes among other countries in different 
regions. In particular, it is obvious that the ratification has not been successful when it 
comes to leading changes in Africa, Middle East, and Asia. Contrary to this 
insignificant ramification of the ratification among those regions, there are dramatic 
changes in North America. Aside from the fact that the graph of the region displaying 
the effect of the ratification looks outstanding due to its relatively small number of 
countries included unlike other regions, it is clear that the US and Canada have been 
trying to develop their technology markedly.     
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Figure 3.9 CO2/GDP change after ratification of UNFCCC 
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Figure 3.9 (Continued) 
North America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10 outlines the change of environmental technology level by region 
and by country over time since ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. One prominent 
observation from this figure is the fact that it displays the progress in technology 
among European and North American regions. The fact that North American region 
shows progress in green technology development is hard to ignore because the US has 
not ratified the Protocol by now. Therefore, it is doubtable whether the Kyoto Protocol 
has indeed influenced the policy regarding environmental protection. To confirm this, 
a careful experiment on statistical significance of the Kyoto Protocol will be presented 
in the later chapter of this paper by using Panel regression.   
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Figure 3.10 CO2/GDP after ratification of the KYOTO protocol 
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Figure 3.10 (Continued) 
North America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Degree of democracy 
 
The degree of democracy in this paper is a variable, which estimates the cost 
of developing green technology, not from a technical standpoint but rather with 
respect to the costs necessary to implement new policies. In other words, the higher 
degree of democracy is associated with more thorough domestic policy analysis which 
requires careful consideration of all possible viewpoints, resulting in greater research 
on the relationship between environmental regulations and economic development. 
Specifically, it might cost more when development-oriented politicians command a 
majority among the decision makers, because the opportunity cost for collecting views 
from the minority is significant. On the other hand, we consider degree of democracy 
as one of the variables that affects welfare weight on profit. This is because increase in 
degree of democracy may also affect domestic welfare weight on profit by enhancing 
chances to reflect the opinions of political minorities. Therefore when degree of 
democracy increases in a country where political minorities are environmentalists, it 
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leads development-oriented politicians to decrease the investment in green technology 
because of the opportunity cost for collecting views of the minorities which affects 
green technology development cost, but at the same time it leads them to increase the 
investment in green technology because of the enhanced chances for the minorities to 
affect policy makers. The data for degree of democracy is from Polity IV Project
14
, 
and the summary statistics for degree of democracy is as follows; 
 
Table 3.5 Summary of degree of democracy 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Demo 1367 6.51 5.46 -10 10 
Highdemo 611 9.63 1.29 -2 10 
Nonhighdemo 752 4.02 6.22 -10 10 
Brdemo 58 -0.344 6.92 -7 9 
* Source: Author‟s calculation using Polity IV Project (2009)  
 
 
As presented in the table above, high-income countries record a higher degree 
of democracy compared to the degree of low-income countries. Let us take a look at 
the relation between the degree of democracy and environmental technology level of 
the high-income countries. As seen in Figure 3.12 through Figure 3.15, high-income 
countries show a relatively steep slope in the linear fit. Unlike non-high income 
countries, the data reveal a clear correlation between political freedom and clean 
technology level among high-income countries. The BRICs countries also show a 
                                            
14
 Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007. 
(The Polity IV Project carries data collection and analysis through 2007 and is under the direction of 
Monty G. Marshall at the Center for Systemic Peace and George Mason University) 
See website http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
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similar correlation with high-income countries and, which results from their domestic 
pressure on economic development. More results will be examined later through our 
panel regressions. Although much of the literature
15
 has been making an effort to 
define the relationship between environment and political variables, there has been no 
consensus yet on the statistical causality.   
 
Figure 3.11 Degree of democracy for all countries and CO2/GDP 
 
 
 
 
                                            
15
 Torras and Boyce (1998) used political rights and civil liberties for both high and low income 
countries as independent variable to estimate the determinants of SO2 emission. Also, Carlsson and 
Lundstroem (2006) used political freedom to estimate the determinant of CO2 emission. Both of them 
did not find statistically significant effect on their dependent variables.  
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Figure 3.12 Degree of democracy for high income countries and CO2/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13 Degree of democracy for non-high income countries and CO2/GDP 
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Figure 3.14 Degree of democracy for BRICs and CO2/GDP 
 
3.5 Results 
 
Recall the estimating equation (3.1).  
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Before estimation, we conduct tests to check the OLS assumptions of multi-
collinearity, normality, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation. It is revealed that 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are our only violations
16
. We also consider the 
possible case of non-stationarity for every variable, which could have caused 
                                            
16
 All tests to check OLS assumptions are reported in section A of the appendix.  
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inconsistency in our estimators and resulted in a spurious regression. In addition, 
computed F-test for the interaction with dummy variables suggests that they do indeed 
have some explanatory power.
17
 Furthermore, the Hausmann specification test to 
evaluate models with random effect and fixed effect was conducted. We find that the 
random effect estimation fits our model better.  
We assume that all countries in our panel data set have the same degree of 
effect on green technology development dynamics from our chosen independent 
variables that we listed above. Since we found out that our panel data set had 
autocorrelation of degree one and heteroskedasticity, we try to correct both of these 
problems by deploying Newey West standard error correction method. The Newey-
West (N-W) Least Variance Estimation is usually conducted for the models where 
FGLS is not feasible to obtain unbiased and consistent estimators. Since our FGLS 
with AR (1) model has failed to render a consistent and unbiased estimator, it is 
necessary to deploy this method to obtain such estimators. We try to explain our 
pooled model using the pooled regression result that has been corrected with the N-W 
method. Also, for the panel regression, we conduct both the country fixed model and 
random effect model. However, as seen in the Hausman test result, a fixed effect 
model offers somewhat limited and less consistent information to support our findings. 
According to Hausman specification test which is presented in Table 3.6, the fixed 
effect model 
18
may render biased outcomes relative to the model that considers all 
variables that we are interested in. We focus our analysis on pooled model and the 
random effect model.   
 
 
                                            
17
 F-test results for interaction variables are reported in section D of the appendix.  
18
 Results for Fixed effect models are reported in the section C of the Appendix.  
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Table 3.6 Specification test for the base model
19
 
 
 Specification CO2/GDP 
 
Hausman Test (χ2) 
  
 
Country specific  
 
14.10 
(0.070) 
Year specific 7.82 
(0.098) 
Note: p-values are in parentheses. 
Testing Hypothesis: Hausman Test H0: random effects, H1: fixed effects 
 
 
 
Table 3.7 Regression results for Pooled model and Random effect model 
                                            
19
 The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the efficient random 
effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimator. If they are 
insignificant, then it is safe to use random effects.  
Independent variables for base model are; UNEMP, SWOPEN, OPEN and DEMO.  
OPEN is excluded in our extended model to avoid multicolinearity with the interaction variables such 
as BROPEN and HIOPEN.  
  Pooled   Random   
Variables  Coeff. Std.E.  Coeff. Std.E  
UNEMP  0.027*** 0.003  0.001*** 0.000  
SWOPEN  -0.111*** 0.041  -0.013* 0.007  
DEMO  0.002 0.004  0.0001 0.000  
BRUNEMP  - 0.030 0.028  -0.022* 0.011  
BRDEMO  -0.089*** 0.020  -0.025*** 0.008  
BROPEN  -0.003 0.006  -0.001 0.001  
HIUEMP  -0.004 0.006  0.001 0.001  
HIDEMO  0.012** 0.006  0.004** 0.001  
HIOPEN  0.001*** 0.000  0.0007*** 0.000  
BRICS  0.959*** 0.227  0.619*** 0.102  
NOAME  0.111*** 0.033  0.145*** 0.024  
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Table 3.7 (Continued) 
Source: WDI (2009), Sachs and Warner (1995), IEA (2006) International 
Environmental Agreements database Ver. 2007.1 and  
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007 (2009)  
***, ** and *denote significance at 1 percent 5 percent and 10 percent level 
respectively 
Note; 1) BROPEN, BRDEMO and BRUNEMP denote the interaction variable 
between BRICs and three dependent variables; Openness, Degree of democracy and 
Unemployment rate  
2) HIOPEN, HIDEMO and HIUNEMP denote the interaction variable between high 
income countries defined by UN and three dependent variables; Openness, Degree of 
democracy and Unemployment rate 
3) CO2 is measured in Metric Tons and real GDP is Thousand 2000 U.S. Dollars 
 
3.5.1 Degree of Openness   
 
For the Sachs and Warner openness measure, our empirical results show that 
the level of technology increases as countries decide to open their economies more to 
the international market. On the other hand, the regular openness measure (amount of 
CSA  -0.031 0.050  -0.070*** 0.019  
EURO  -0.184*** 0.047  -0.044*** 0.016  
EURA  0.824*** 0.139  0.892*** 0.085  
MIDEA  0.306*** 0.076  0.526*** 0.103  
AFRI  -0.091 0.059  -0.103*** 0.020  
IRTAP  0.053 0.037  -0.009 0.008  
MONT  -0.018 0.038  -0.005 0.004  
UNFCCC  -0.034 0.042  -0.008** 0.004  
KYOTO  -0.004 0.036  -0.012*** 0.004  
Const.  0.291*** 0.056  0.399*** 0.016  
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export and import divided by real GDP) shows that the level of green technology 
decreases as countries decide to open their economies.  
Therefore, our results for the Sachs and Warner openness measure do not 
support the pollution haven hypothesis that has been supported by recent literature 
(Mani and Wheeler (1998)). Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine 
whether the hypothesis is right, since it is virtually impossible to obtain micro industry 
data at the firm level that can prove which industry has a relative advantage in 
producing products using “dirty” technology, it seems that trade in general has a 
positive effect on cleaning the pollution as argued by other strands of literature. 
(Grassebner, Lamla and Strum (2006))  
Also, our result shows the net effect of openness on green technology 
development. Using the Sachs and Warner openness measure, we can see that global 
consciousness on the environment outweighs the domestic pressure of growth 
although the availability of green technology makes these objectives compatible. This 
implies that as the degree of openness increases there is cultural spillover or cultural 
exchange that affects the domestic focus on the environment. Furthermore, this 
supports our assumption that trade liberalization affects the cost of developing green 
technology by providing countries easier access to green technology. 
 However, when it comes to trade volume divided by GDP openness measure, 
we find different results. For example, high income countries show the opposite sign 
and BRICs show no statistical significance for both the pooled and random effects 
models.  
Several factors have influenced these effects of the openness measure on 
green technology development. First, the trading partners for BRICs countries were 
not as diverse as developed countries. This implies that if the major trading partners 
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are the ones that do not require rigorous environmental standards it may reduce the 
incentive to develop green technology. According to the Direction of Trade statistics 
Yearbook by the IMF, major trade partners of BRICs were developed countries such as 
the United States (IMF (2005)). In fact, except for Russia whose major trading partner 
was the European Union, all BRICs countries traded most significantly with the 
United States, one of the largest carbon gas emitters. However, in recent years the 
BRICs countries have been trying to diversify their trading partners. According to the 
Comparative Analysis of the BRICs by the Economic and Social Research Institute 
(ESRI (2006)), all BRICs have increased their trade with neighbor countries.  Brazil 
made an effort to increase coordination with Latin America through initiatives such as 
the establishment of the South American Summit and the reinforcement of 
MERCOSUR
20
, a regional Trade Agreement among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay. Russia tried to promote regional economic integration through CIS
21
 
economic alliance, a unified economic zone with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, 
and the Eurasian Economic Community. India tried to ratify bilateral and multilateral 
free trade agreements with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
India showed progress of developing trade agreements with countries outside the 
region such as South Korea, Japan and China.  Lastly, China concluded a free trade 
contract with ASEAN and Far East Asian countries in order to formulate and reinforce 
regional economic integration.   
Also, an effort to reach regional economic integration by BRICs is still 
ongoing and may displace the United States as the group‟s main trading partner. Thus, 
the transformation of the trade pattern may result in a different test result for our 
                                            
20
 MERCOSUR implies Southern Common Market in English.    
21
 Commonwealth of Independent States is a regional organization whose participating countries are 
former Soviet Republics. 
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regression. On the other hand, high income countries are relatively diversified in terms 
of their trading partners, which consist of a wide range of countries outside the BRICs 
group. This implies that they have to follow more rigorous environmental standards in 
order to maintain their status in the output competition market.   
In addition, we should note that we use a different openness measure for those 
two different country groups largely because of the multicollinearity problem for the 
interaction between dummy variables. This degree of openness measure
22
 for BRICs 
and High income countries may be different from that of the Sachs and Warner 
openness measure since it mainly measures volume of export and import and does not 
take into account other openness standards such as the five criteria for the Sachs and 
Warner openness measure. Therefore, in order to compare the result from using the 
Sachs and Warner criteria, both country groups may need to consider other political 
aspects in addition to the export and import amount (i.e. five criteria of Sachs and 
Warner measurement). However, since the focus of our paper is to give a general idea 
of the role of the openness measure on technology development, we will not attempt to 
go further.  
 
3.5.2 Unemployment  
 
Our results for both pooled and random effects show that an increase in 
unemployment rate has a negative association on developing green technology. This 
supports our hypothesis that high unemployment rate causes political pressure on 
growth so as to create new jobs. Many researchers have studied the relationship 
between the social and political variables and the environment. Particularly, social or 
                                            
22
 Volume of export and import divided by GDP 
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political instability has been the major variable in the empirical models of this 
literature. For instance, according to the recent empirical studies that considered 
inequality variables, such as the GINI ratio, as a proxy for social instability, social 
inequality contributes to the generation of pollution (Grassebner, Lamla and Strum 
(2006), Ravallion et al. (1997)). Just like the GINI ratio, unemployment could be 
interpreted as a sign of social instability in that both result in policy reforms.  
We may consider the possibility that as social instability, represented as 
unemployment, increases in a country, the country tends to put more emphasis on 
economic growth rather than a clean environment. According to our study, however, 
there is no statistical significance in the country group dummies except for BRICs. 
Therefore, it is premature to say that there is a negative relation between 
unemployment and the investment in clean technology development. To put it another 
way, we cannot conclude that unemployment in one country causes political 
constraints regardless of economic development levels.  
 
3.5.3 Regional Peer Effect 
 
Statistically significant results have been discovered in five out of seven 
regions in our study. Among these five regions, which include the European, Eurasian, 
Central and Southern America, African and Asian/Oceania regions, the positive 
regional peer effect on technology development appeared only in European, Central 
and Southern American, and African regions. It seems that results for these five 
regions are consistent with our hypothesis that regional dummies may affect a 
country‟s welfare weight on the environment. Also the results possibly imply that there 
are cooperative efforts to develop green technology.    
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Although the European region as a whole consists of both developing and 
developed countries, the majority of OECD and high-income countries are included in 
the region influencing the result considerably. If we assume that the Environmental 
Kuznet Curve (EKC), the inverted U shaped curve representing the relationship 
between growth and environmental pollution, exists, then the EU‟s composition 
primarily of wealth countries implies that this region should have an overall focus on 
environmental issues. Moreover, the characteristics of highly developed economic 
integration in the region, in the form of the EU, should have provided less 
environmentally conscious countries in the region with enough incentives to 
cooperatively develop the clean technology.  
Contrary to the European region, both the Central and Southern America 
region and the African region consist mainly of less developed countries where the 
absolute level of green technology is relatively low, as shown in the Figure 3.9 and 
3.10. Therefore, even if both regions showed positive peer effects on developing clean 
technologies, it is risky to immediately come to this conclusion, since their low 
economic development level is strongly linked to their low carbon emissions.   
Meanwhile, the Middle East region and Eurasian region where less developed 
countries are the majority showed less tendency to develop the green technology.  
Besides the degree of development, however, there are more factors to 
consider regarding regional peer effects on developing green technology. Data for 
major trading partners, and major exporting and importing sectors should be also 
incorporated and considered together. As an example, many countries in the Middle 
East region would tend to export their primary resource, mainly oil, which is a major 
source of the CO2 emission. Therefore, those countries have less incentive for green 
technology development and major trading partners who import oil from those 
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countries cannot put pressure on them, regardless of their own opposite high domestic 
standard on environmental regulations.  
Nevertheless, the intuition behind what we found from our regional dummies 
is that if international trade occurs more frequently within the region through regional 
economic integration or Free Trade Agreements, and if that region has relatively high 
environmental standards, then there is a possibility of having regional joint efforts to 
develop green technology not only to benefit from the clean air but also to reduce the 
cost of production. 
 
3.5.4 Convention and Protocol dummies 
 
As mentioned, the convention and protocol dummies are deployed to measure 
the effects of ratification of the convention. As we stated earlier, it is regarded as a 
commitment to use resources to curb emission of greenhouse gases. While there were 
no significant convention dummies found in our pooled model, the random effects 
model has presented statistical significance for some conventions and protocols. Two 
out of four conventions, the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, showed that they actually 
have induced a positive effect on the development of green technology. We should 
however be careful interpreting this result since convention dummies are likely to lose 
information content over time if ratification for each country becomes strategic 
complements (Chau and Kanbur (2002)). In Chapter 2, we examined a case where 
technological investment of each country can be regarded as strategic substitutes. 
However, it was valid only when the welfare weight on profits is 1 and green 
technology prevails. If the welfare consideration of clean environment counts, it may 
well be the case that countries‟ ratification of environmental conventions and protocols 
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can become strategic complement. Hence, we consider our results with the knowledge 
that ratification of these environmental conventions may not necessarily reflect a 
country‟s overall concern for the environment. 
 
3.5.5 Degree of Democracy 
 
As mentioned, the Degree of democracy (DEMO) has two different alleged 
causal impacts on the development of clean technology causing controversies within 
the literature. One of our assumptions is concerned about the extent to which the 
degree of democracy affects the cost of developing green technology. Transaction 
costs are generated when politicians try to encompass the opinions of minorities, and 
the influence of degree of democracy on developing green technology depends on who 
makes up that minority. The other assumption is that aside from the linkage between 
degree of democracy and the cost, democracy itself may influence the social welfare 
weight on profit or environment directly by enhancing chances for political minorities 
to reflect their opinions.
23
  
It is not easy to figure out the underlying mechanism. In fact Carlsson and 
Lundstrom (2003) found no relationship between the CO2 emission and political 
freedom. Our results do not strongly support any hypothesis in general, however, for 
the case of the developed countries (HIGH) or highly developing countries (BRICs) 
there are certain noticeable statistical signs favorable for developing the low carbon 
emission technology.  
If we assume that political minorities for both country groups are 
                                            
23
 Therefore, if we assume that political minorities are environmentalists, increase in degree of 
democracy implies 1) negative effect on developing green technology by increasing development cost 
of the technology 2) positive effect on developing green technology by raising chances for minorities to 
reflect their opinions on domestic policy.    
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environmentalists, it seems that the net effect of both influence on developing green 
technology showed differently for both high income countries and BRICs. For high 
income countries, the negative effect by increase in cost of developing green 
technology seems to dominate the other effects.  As for the BRICs it seems that the 
minority opinion of environmentalists is well reflected when the degree of democracy 
develops.  
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Chapter 4  
CONCLUSION 
 
Many existing studies have pointed out various amendments that should be 
considered in order to enhance the function of existing international environmental 
conventions. Following Barret (2006), this paper recognizes the importance of green 
technology to counteract global warming, and investigates the strategic role of 
government in technological investment in the global economy. In fact the paper 
attempts to provide a theoretical and empirical background to discuss this important 
hypothesis on technological response to climate change in a more general framework. 
We examine the individual incentives for free riding in reducing global warming as 
well as profit incentives to strengthen competitiveness in the international output 
market. We show that depending on the shape of the social welfare function, and the 
availability of green technology, a profit incentive can reinforce other incentives to 
clean the environment. In other words, countries do have an incentive to invest in R & 
D for clean technologies in order to occupy an advantageous status in international 
output competition. Since the investment incentives lessen the free riding incentives 
that prevail in the absence of green technologies, we characterize features of countries 
which have invested in clean technology in a relatively intensive way.  
According to our theoretical propositions, the level of technology depends on 
the degree of openness, the cost of technological development and the welfare weights 
each country places on economic profits and the environment.  
We specify an econometric model to test the relative importance of these 
variables through panel data. First of all, we find the degree of openness is related to 
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the degree of the green technology development. We find that countries that have been 
under high growth pressure do not necessarily confirm this relationship. However, 
when we consider the different openness measurement, the Sachs and Warner 
openness measure, it seems that degree of openness is positively related to the 
development of green technology.  
The unemployment rate, meanwhile, is negatively related to green technology 
development. However, this variable also shows a different relationship in our 
different country groups. In fact, we did not find any robust relationship between 
unemployment rate in BRICs or high income countries.  
 Interestingly, the regional peer effort of developing green technology seems to 
exist in certain regions. The intuition behind our result is that the more the region is 
comprised of wealthy countries whose welfare weights on the environment are high, 
the more the region tends to develop the green technology. For instance, we find that 
the European region with shared cultural heritage shows a positive peer effect on 
developing the green technology. However, we find the opposite effect for the North 
American Region. The statistical relationship between these variables may suggest a 
causal impact from belonging to one of these groups, such as pressure elicited from 
larger countries in the group to adhere to their environmental beliefs. However, it may 
only reflect a mere associative relationship, such that North American countries tend 
to care less about the environment while European countries have greater concern. 
Further analysis should examine the effect of this regional clustering on strategic 
investment policy. 
Given their importance to international climate concerns we also examine the 
effect of the major convention dummies that countries have signed and ratified. 
However, only two out of four dummies are statistically significant and both of them 
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show a positive effect on developing green technology. Further research to examine 
the peer effect should be conducted to confirm the reason why only two conventions 
are significant. The information content of convention dummies needs to be clarified 
further as previous literature has identified the possibility of countries‟ ratification of 
international conventions as strategic complements. 
In addition, we considered the degree of democracy an important variable that 
influences the cost of clean technology investment. As a growing amount of research 
has pointed out, any relationship between pollution and political freedom is quite 
controversial. As expected we could not find the relationship between pollution 
reducing technology and political freedom. However, for the high income countries 
and highly developing countries such as BRICs significant results are found. In fact, 
they show totally different effects on technology development. For BRICs countries 
we find that the degree of democracy promotes the development of green technologies. 
High income countries, however, show the opposite result.  
Finally, we would like to point out that empirical findings need further 
elaboration in the future. They can be considered as background material to evaluate 
the development incentives of green technologies for sustainable growth in the global 
market. Therefore, we need to address shortcomings of the theoretical propositions 
that are used as a basis of our empirical test. Particularly, the model needs to be further 
extended by incorporating a more general strategic situation such as a leader-follower 
case. The model also needs to incorporate tax policy, since government tax policy 
toward global warming play an important role in international efforts to prevent 
climate change. These tax policies influence the costs and benefits of developing green 
technologies. Finally, the social welfare function may not be sufficiently smooth and 
well shaped in important decision variables. We however leave the analysis of an 
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extended model for a future research project. 
APPENDIX 
 
A. Test for OLS assumption 
 
In this section, we attempt to confirm that our final model satisfies all the OLS 
assumptions. 
 
A.1. Multicollinearity 
 
We start by examining existence of multicollinearity. If samples have high 
multicollinearity, the model might encounter insignificant t ratio, a higher 2R  value, 
wrong signs for regression coefficients, unstable OLS estimators, and a difficulty in 
assessing the individual contributions of explanatory variables to the explained sum of 
squares or 2R . Auxiliary regressions and variance inflation factors help to determine 
if harmful collinearity is present.  
Since multicollinearity occurs because one or more of the explanatory 
variables are roughly linear combinations of other explanatory variables, regressing 
each variable on the remaining variables help indentify if these linear combinations 
exist. If the variables in the final model do not have serious corrlelation we may use all 
the variables in the final model. However, if there is serious linearity among some 
variables we would have to eliminate or transform the trouble making variable from 
the model. 
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Table A.1. OLS result for Final model (Auxiliary regression) and VIF layout 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .2911723   .0396087     7.35   0.000     .2134709    .3688737
      swopen    -.1111967   .0310532    -3.58   0.000    -.1721146   -.0502788
       unemp     .0272084   .0025612    10.62   0.000     .0221841    .0322327
       kyoto     -.004039    .028062    -0.14   0.886     -.059089     .051011
      unfccc    -.0349287   .0271027    -1.29   0.198    -.0880969    .0182395
        mont    -.0183818   .0288553    -0.64   0.524     -.074988    .0382245
       irtap     .0534599   .0232557     2.30   0.022     .0078385    .0990814
        afri    -.0913891   .0451527    -2.02   0.043    -.1799664   -.0028117
       midea      .306767    .112337     2.73   0.006     .0863923    .5271417
        eura     .8247156   .0516031    15.98   0.000     .7234843    .9259469
        euro    -.1843513   .0323565    -5.70   0.000     -.247826   -.1208767
         csa    -.0316569   .0328283    -0.96   0.335     -.096057    .0327433
       noame     .1116898   .0491074     2.27   0.023     .0153545    .2080252
        demo     .0023091   .0026427     0.87   0.382    -.0028752    .0074934
       brics     .9597565   .1248439     7.69   0.000     .7148467    1.204666
      hiopen     .0015395   .0002879     5.35   0.000     .0009747    .0021043
      hidemo     .0125972   .0049534     2.54   0.011       .00288    .0223145
     hiunemp    -.0004712   .0040839    -0.12   0.908    -.0084827    .0075403
      bropen    -.0039575   .0027612    -1.43   0.152    -.0093742    .0014592
      brdemo    -.0895516   .0093038    -9.63   0.000    -.1078031   -.0713001
     brunemp    -.0307886   .0205436    -1.50   0.134    -.0710896    .0095123
                                                                              
      co2gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    292.969724  1366  .214472711           Root MSE      =  .34248
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.4531
    Residual    157.875741  1346  .117292526           R-squared     =  0.4611
       Model    135.093983    20  6.75469915           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 20,  1346) =   57.59
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1367
 
    Mean VIF        3.01
                                    
       midea        1.17    0.851806
       noame        1.33    0.752709
       irtap        1.37    0.729481
       kyoto        1.41    0.709516
        eura        1.53    0.654370
      swopen        1.64    0.610743
        afri        1.89    0.529553
       unemp        1.94    0.515033
      brdemo        2.02    0.495626
      unfccc        2.11    0.473644
      hiopen        2.27    0.440315
        mont        2.39    0.418297
        demo        2.43    0.410973
         csa        2.52    0.397326
        euro        2.76    0.362900
     hiunemp        4.72    0.211997
      bropen        5.55    0.180091
      hidemo        6.77    0.147645
     brunemp        7.00    0.142906
       brics        7.38    0.135499
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
 
 
 
VIF over 10 indicates that we have severe multicollinearity. It seems that our 
final model indicates no severe multicollinearity is present.  
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A.2 Heteroskedasticity 
 
One of the main assumptions for the ordinary least squares regression is 
homogeneity of variance of residuals. If our model is well fitted, there should be no 
pattern to the residuals plotted against the fitted values. If the variance of the residuals 
is non-constant then the residual variance is said to be “heteroskedastic.” There are 
graphical and non-graphical methods for detecting heteroskedasticity. A commonly 
used graphical method is to plot the residual versus fitted (predicted) values. If we 
observe that the pattern of data points gets narrower towards the right end it is an 
indication of heteroskedasticity.  
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Figure A.1 residual versus fitted (predicted) values of final model 
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From the graph above, it is difficult to conclude that there exists 
heteroskedasticity for our final model. Therefore it is necessary to conduct a formal 
test to confirm the existence of heteroskedasticity.  
 
Table A.2. Breusch-Pagen/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of co2gdp 
chi2(1)      =  1163.38 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
Breusch-Pagen test is a formal test to check the existence of 
heteroskedasticity. It tests the null hypothesis that variance of the residual is 
homogeneous. Hence, if the P-value is small enough, we would have to reject the null 
hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that variance is not homogeneous. In 
this case, we conclude that we do have enough evidence to reject null hypothesis that 
the model has homoskedasticity.  
 
A.3 Autocorrelation 
 
First we attempt to plot the residual from our regression against time in order 
to check graphically whether the serial correlation exists.  
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Figure A.2 Residual plot over time 
 
Patterns of residual over time raise possibility of serial correlation. Therefore, 
we conduct formal test to confirm this fact.  
 
Table A.3 Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in Panel data 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F(  1,      70) =     37.024 
Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
The null hypothesis for the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data is 
that there is no first order serial correlation. Therefore, we have enough evidence to 
reject null hypothesis that our model has no first order serial correlation.   
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A.4.Normality 
 
Normality of residual is another OLS assumption that we need to check before 
conducting panel regression. First we take a look at density of residual.  
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Figure A.3. Kernel density estimate 
It seems like normality assumption on our model is not violated. Now let us 
conduct a formal test to confirm this fact.  
 
Table A.4 Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
    Variable |    Obs        W          V           z       Prob>z 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          res |   1367    0.81080    158.666     12.705  0.00000 
 
Above is the Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality. The p-value is based on the 
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assumption that the distribution is normal. In this case, it is small enough (0.000) to 
conclude that residual for the final model is normally distributed.  
 
A.5. Stationary data  
 
Since our data for final model is time series and cross sectional, we need to 
check the variables that change over time are stationary.  If the variable that is 
included in final model are not stationary it may be necessary to take differentiation or 
log differentiation. We can confirm this by graphically examining relationship matrix 
among variables that change over time.  
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Figure A.5Variable relationship matrix 
 
By examining the relationship matrix we confirm that variables that change 
over time are stationary since we do not observe any variables that consistently 
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decrease or increase over time.  
 
B. OLS results for chapter 3.4 
 
Here we post our regression results for different measures of degree of 
openness. First, we consider the Sachs and Warner openness measure from Table B.1 
to B.4.  
 
 
Table B.1 OLS result between CO2/GDP and Sachs and Warner openness 
measure for all countries 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .7794215    .028974    26.90   0.000      .722583    .8362599
      swopen    -.2804082   .0319387    -8.78   0.000    -.3430624    -.217754
                                                                              
      co2gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    292.969724  1366  .214472711           Root MSE      =  .45073
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0528
    Residual    277.310124  1365    .2031576           R-squared     =  0.0535
       Model    15.6595995     1  15.6595995           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,  1365) =   77.08
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1367
 
   
      
 
Table B.2 OLS result between CO2/GDP and Sachs and Warner openness 
measure for high income countries 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     1.240588   .0820068    15.13   0.000     1.079538    1.401639
      swhigh    -.7010596    .083172    -8.43   0.000    -.8643984   -.5377208
                                                                              
      co2gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    77.7479292   610  .127455622           Root MSE      =  .33812
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1030
    Residual    69.6251611   609   .11432703           R-squared     =  0.1045
       Model    8.12276812     1  8.12276812           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   609) =   71.05
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     611
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Table B.3 OLS result between CO2/GDP and Sachs and Warner openness 
measure for non-high income countries 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .7445778   .0344833    21.59   0.000     .6768831    .8122725
   swnonhigh    -.2908866   .0411455    -7.07   0.000      -.37166   -.2101132
                                                                              
      co2gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    215.102748   755  .284904303           Root MSE      =  .51725
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0609
    Residual    201.730552   754  .267547151           R-squared     =  0.0622
       Model    13.3721968     1  13.3721968           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   754) =   49.98
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     756
 
 
Table B.4 OLS result between CO2/GDP and Sachs and Warner openness 
measure for BRICs  
     
                                                                              
       _cons     1.405227    .111514    12.60   0.000     1.181838    1.628617
        swbr     -1.04737   .2269756    -4.61   0.000    -1.502057   -.5926833
                                                                              
      co2gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     42.291462    57  .741955473           Root MSE      =   .7397
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2625
    Residual    30.6407334    56  .547155954           R-squared     =  0.2755
       Model    11.6507285     1  11.6507285           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,    56) =   21.29
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      58
 
 
Next, we consider openness measure as import and export volume divided by GDP. 
  
Table B.5 OLS result between CO2/GDP and regular openness measure for all 
countries 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .4225057   .0242562    17.42   0.000     .3749223    .4700892
        open     .0017672   .0002923     6.05   0.000     .0011937    .0023406
                                                                              
      co2gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    292.969724  1366  .214472711           Root MSE      =   .4572
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0254
    Residual    285.330627  1365  .209033426           R-squared     =  0.0261
       Model    7.63909655     1  7.63909655           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,  1365) =   36.54
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1367
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Table B.6 OLS result between CO2/GDP and regular openness measure for high 
income countries 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .4301081   .0266388    16.15   0.000     .3777931    .4824232
      hiopen     .0017244   .0003024     5.70   0.000     .0011305    .0023183
                                                                              
      co2gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    77.7479292   610  .127455622           Root MSE      =  .34813
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0491
    Residual     73.807744   609  .121194982           R-squared     =  0.0507
       Model    3.94018521     1  3.94018521           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   609) =   32.51
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     611
 
 
 
 
Table B.7 OLS result between CO2/GDP and regular openness measure for  
non-high-income 
                                                                              
       _cons     .4164546   .0395436    10.53   0.000     .3388259    .4940833
 nonhighopen     .0018035    .000503     3.59   0.000     .0008159     .002791
                                                                              
      co2gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    215.102748   755  .284904303           Root MSE      =  .52962
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0155
    Residual    211.497573   754   .28050076           R-squared     =  0.0168
       Model    3.60517577     1  3.60517577           Prob > F      =  0.0004
                                                       F(  1,   754) =   12.85
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     756
 
 
 
Table B.8 OLS result between CO2/GDP and regular openness measure for 
BRICs 
                                                                              
       _cons     .6734663   .2303026     2.92   0.005     .2121148    1.134818
      bropen     .0139253   .0059013     2.36   0.022     .0021037     .025747
                                                                              
      co2gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     42.291462    57  .741955473           Root MSE      =   .8288
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0742
    Residual    38.4666042    56  .686903647           R-squared     =  0.0904
       Model    3.82485776     1  3.82485776           Prob > F      =  0.0218
                                                       F(  1,    56) =    5.57
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      58
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C. Fixed effect results  
 
C.1 Base model with fixed effect 
 
 Since we find both heterskedasticity and autocorrelation for our panel data 
set we use Drisoll-Kraay standard errors to correct both so as to obtain consistent and 
robust result for panel regression with fixed effect. Driscoll and Kraay standard errors 
are the standard errors that are heteroskedasticity consistent and robust to cross-
sectional as well as temporal dependence. 
The regression result is as follow. 
 
 
Table C.1 Base Model with Fixed effect  
                                                                              
       _cons     .5794826   .0258097    22.45   0.000     .5282575    .6307077
      swopen     .0891295   .0241672     3.69   0.000     .0411643    .1370947
        open    -.0017944   .0004056    -4.42   0.000    -.0025995   -.0009894
       unemp     .0003686   .0015423     0.24   0.812    -.0026925    .0034296
        demo     .0031652   .0010568     3.00   0.003     .0010678    .0052625
                                                                              
      co2gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.0499
maximum lag: 1                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): coun_new                     F(  4,    97)     =      8.32
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        98
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =      1367
 
 
 
C.2 Final model with fixed effect 
 
 Here again we use Driscoll and Kraay standard errors to control both 
heteroskedasticiy and a serial correlation. The regression result is as follow. 
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Table C.2 Final model with fixed effect 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .1823653   .1796146     1.02   0.312    -.1741199    .5388505
      swopen      .117783   .0249782     4.72   0.000     .0682082    .1673579
       unemp    -.0010796   .0012051    -0.90   0.373    -.0034714    .0013121
       kyoto    -.0225368   .0109714    -2.05   0.043    -.0443121   -.0007616
      unfccc    -.0375966   .0170626    -2.20   0.030    -.0714612    -.003732
        mont    -.0033863   .0128611    -0.26   0.793    -.0289121    .0221395
       irtap    -.0829731   .0724663    -1.14   0.255    -.2267986    .0608524
        demo     .0022721   .0011208     2.03   0.045     .0000476    .0044967
      hiopen    -.0018401   .0006402    -2.87   0.005    -.0031108   -.0005694
      hidemo     .0929142   .0375295     2.48   0.015     .0184285    .1673999
     hiunemp     .0047926   .0029447     1.63   0.107    -.0010517     .010637
      bropen    -.0231948   .0072302    -3.21   0.002    -.0375448   -.0088449
      brdemo     .0063333   .0078136     0.81   0.420    -.0091745    .0218412
     brunemp    -.0219333    .028152    -0.78   0.438    -.0778073    .0339407
                                                                              
      co2gdp        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Drisc/Kraay
                                                                              
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.2612
maximum lag: 1                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000
Group variable (i): coun_new                     F( 13,    97)     =     52.41
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        98
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =      1367
 
 
D. F test for interaction terms 
D.1. Interaction with high income countries 
( 1)  hiunemp = 0 
 ( 2)  hidemo = 0 
 ( 3)  hiopen = 0 
 
       F(  3,  1346) =   25.81 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
We have enough evidence to reject null hypothesis that interaction variables with high 
income countries dummy are all 0.  
D.2. Interaction with BRICs 
 
 ( 1)  brunemp = 0 
 ( 2)  brdemo = 0 
 ( 3)  bropen = 0 
 
       F(  3,  1346) =   60.48 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
We have enough evidence to reject null hypothesis that interaction variables with 
BRICs dummy are all 0.  
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D.3. All interaction variables 
 
 ( 1)  brunemp = 0 
 ( 2)  brdemo = 0 
 ( 3)  bropen = 0 
 ( 4)  hiunemp = 0 
 ( 5)  hidemo = 0 
 ( 6)  hiopen = 0 
 
       F(  6,  1346) =   44.32 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
We have enough evidence to reject null hypothesis that interaction variables with 
BRICs dummy are all 0. 
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